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Measuring the Racial Unevenness of Law
School
Jonathan Feingold* & Doug Souza**
INTRODUCTION
Consider the following hypothetical. Two law students recently completed
their first year at a prestigious American law school.
The first student, Anne, is a single mother of two young children, Erin and
Max. Anne receives several loans that cover the majority of her law school
fees, but must also work part-time to cover living expenses for herself and her
children. As a single parent, Anne is solely responsible for raising and caring
for Erin and Max. Anne completed her first year of law school with a B+ grade
point average (GPA).
The second student, Dan, is one year out of college and has no children.
Dan’s parents have had successful careers and, fortunately for Dan, they have
been prudent with their money. Dan’s parents were able to pay his college
tuition and over half of his law school fees. He has taken out a few loans that
cover the balance and provide more than enough for his living expenses. Dan
completed his first year of law school with a B+ GPA.
Now, imagine you oversee hiring at a prominent law firm. With one
position left to fill, you receive applications from Anne and Dan. You must
determine who will make the more talented attorney. Although a serious
assessment may demand a deeper review, all you know about each student are
their respective GPAs and general circumstances as described in the preceding
paragraphs.
Though imperfect for many reasons,1 law school GPA frequently serves
as a proxy for legal talent; a tool to differentiate between students.2 Utilizing
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GPA in this way relies on the assumption that a similar GPA should
communicate the same thing for each student. Based on this assumption, Anne
and Dan’s respective GPAs would suggest that the students, at least in terms of
legal talent, are quite similar. However, Anne’s route to a B+ was filled with
obstacles that Dan never faced. Beyond studying and preparing for final exams,
a baseline task common to all students, Anne divided her time between caring
for her children and working a part-time job. Dan, in contrast, faced only the
baseline task.
Due to this imbalance, Anne’s B+ is arguably more impressive than
Dan’s. In other words, Dan was unable to out-perform Anne even with this
advantage. Looking to GPA in the abstract clearly is not enough. To account
for this difference, proper reliance on GPA may require departing from an
acontextual lens for one that recognizes the students’ distinct circumstances.
Since adding this layer of context should facilitate an employer’s ability to
accurately identify the more talented attorney, refining our reliance on GPA
should ultimately promote meritocracy.3
This hypothetical presents an example of unevenness. Unevenness refers
to benefits and burdens that have nothing to do with an individual’s inherent
ability, talent, or hustle. Rather, unevenness describes the presence of particular
burdens that uniquely tax certain individuals in a given setting; other members
of the community do not face these burdens. Above, Anne’s unique financial
1. Relying on standardized testing and grades as a proxy for academic ability has
spurred various critiques. One area of critique cites growing findings that, as a result of stereotype
threat, standardized tests systematically underestimate the academic ability of Black and Latino
students. See Brief of Experimental Psychologists et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Fisher v. University of Texas (August 13, 2012) (No. 01-1015); Jonathan Feingold, Racing
Towards Colorblindness: Stereotype Threat and the Myth of Meritocracy, 3 GEO. J. L. & MOD.
CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 231 (2012); Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A
Behavioral Realist Revision of ‘Affirmative Action,’ 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063 (2006) [hereinafter
Kang, Fair Measures]; Gregory Walton et al., Affirmative Meritocracy, SOC. ISS. POL. REV. (In
Press) (estimating that given particular threat conditions, stereotype threat causes the undermeasure of academic ability); Gregory M. Walton & Steven J. Spencer, Latent Ability: Grades
and Test Scores Systematically Underestimate the Intellectual Ability of Negatively Stereotyped
Students, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1132, 1137 (2009) (observing that as a result of stereotype threat, “the
SAT Math and SAT Reading tests underestimate the intellectual ability of African and Hispanic
Americans . . . by a total of 39-40 points,” which is significant considering the “Black-White and
Hispanic-White gaps on the SAT (combining math and reading) are 199 and 148 points,
respectively”). For alternative critiques of standardized testing, see, e.g., What’s Wrong with
Standardized Tests, FAIRTEST (May 22, 2012, 9:26 PM), http://www.fairtest.org/facts/
whatwron.htm.
2.
Beyond GPA, many employers will consider membership in law journals and
participation on mock trial, moot court, or other extracurricular organizations and activities. As a
result of her circumstances, it is likely that Anne has less time to participate in such endeavors.
Dan, on the other hand, may be able to develop a resume full of such extracurriculars because he
has no responsibilities beyond his personal performance in law school.
3. Cf. Kang & Banaji, Fair Measures, supra note 1 (discussing the potential for tiebreakers to promote race-neutrality and reduce racial discrimination in the presence of implicit
bias).
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and familial responsibilities produced a particular unevenness. In a different
context, unevenness would exist if one Olympic sprinter was forced to wear
weighted clothing yet the other racers remained free to run in lightweight
synthetic.4 The weighted clothing, by uniquely burdening the sprinter, creates
the unevenness. A tie between the sprinter and another runner conceptually
parallels the tie between Anne and Dan. Just as that tiebreaker would fall in
Anne’s favor, accounting for the weighted clothing suggests that the sprinter is
actually the faster runner.
In this Article, we focus on racial unevenness and examine the common
manifestations of racial unevenness in American law schools. Racial
unevenness, which we introduce in Part I, refers to the presence of particular
burdens that affect an individual solely because of her race. These burdens,
which most often arise because an individual falls outside of the racial norm,5
manifest across a spectrum. At one end lie obvious forms of overt and invidious
racial discrimination. At the other end, racial unevenness arises from
environmental factors and institutional culture independent from any
identifiable perpetrator. As we detail below, race-dependent burdens can arise
in institutions and communities that expressly promote racial diversity and
condemn overt racial discrimination; good intentions are no panacea to racial
unevenness.6
Part II analyzes manifestations of racial unevenness common to American
law schools.7 Beyond law school’s baseline challenges,8 Students of Color must

	
  
	
  
4. Others have employed a track metaphor, in which a participant’s race, gender and
socio-economic status correspond to a particular lane and its associated challenges. See AAPF’s
Track Metaphor—The Unequal Opportunity Race, AFRICAN AMERICAN POLICY FORUM (Oct. 31,
2012), http://aapf.org/tool_to_speak_out/track-metaphor-aminated-film/. Alternatively, imagine a
sporting event in which only one player has to deal with a vociferous heckler. The heckler burdens
one member of the group only, which creates the unevenness. As a policy matter, unevenness may
not inherently necessitate an intervention. We are not arguing that stadiums should prohibit fans
from yelling at athletes. However, we do believe that intervention is appropriate in law school
when unevenness results from an individual characteristic such as race, gender or sexual
orientation. These are not the factors that should determine law school’s winners and losers.
5. By “racial norm,” we refer to the racial group in a particular context that functions as
the baseline from which difference is measured. Racial demographics and broader social and
cultural elements interact to determine which race occupies this baseline position in a given
situation. In the American context, whiteness remains the baseline; Whites remain numerical
majorities in most spaces and racial difference is measured in terms of distance from whiteness.
Due to this White baseline, racial unevenness in the United States most commonly burdens People
of Color. Whites rarely bear the weight of this unevenness.
6.
See infra Part I.B.ii (describing the multiple causes and manifestations of racial
unevenness that are not the product of intentional discrimination).
7. For the majority of this Article, we break students into two groups: Students of Color
and White students. There are multiple legitimate concerns with such a framing. Grouping
Students of Color obscures the degree of difference and heterogeneity that exists across groups
and leaves even less room to appreciate the differences within a single racial category. Writing in
White versus non-White terms also risks perpetuating a White-centrist frame that reproduces
White as a non-racial and exclusive category. Although we recognize these concerns, we chose to
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also contend with racial unevenness and its associated burdens. These burdens
can produce intersecting harms and headwinds that span from emotional and
mental anguish to academic underperformance.9 Because whiteness remains the
baseline in nearly every major American law school,10 White students do not
face these challenges.11 In the zero sum game of law school,12 racial
unevenness effectively privileges White students. However, with the wind at
their backs, White students often fail to recognize this advantage.13
Part III concludes with a detailed analysis of the Diversity Action
Committee Survey on Diversity and Classroom Climate (DAC Survey), which
law students administered at UCLA School of Law in the spring of 2012. The
DAC Survey constitutes one of the first attempts to measure racial unevenness
in law school. Relying on quantitative and qualitative metrics, 14 the DAC
Survey contributes to prior research that has measured racial unevenness in

	
  
	
  
	
  
disaggregate students in this manner to facilitate analyzing the DAC survey and, since White
remains the baseline in the American racial regime, difference in law school is most often
measured off of whiteness.
8. All students must deal with the normal challenges of law school, which include,
inter alia, learning how to read an appellate opinion, dissect and understand a fact pattern, and
fluently speak a new “legal” language.
9. See, e.g., Daniel Solórzano et al., Critical Race Theory, Racial Microaggressions,
and Campus Racial Climate: The Experiences of African American College Students, 69 J. NEGRO
EDUC. 60, 62 (2000) (discussing the harms associated with racially hostile environments,
including psychological and mental anguish and feelings of stigmatization and marginalization);
Derald Wing Sue et al., Racial Microaggressions in Everyday Life, 62 AM. PSYCHOL. 271, 271
(2007) (discussing harms associated with racial microaggressions); Walton & Spencer, supra note
1 (discussing how stereotype threat, which is likely to arise in racially hostile environments,
hinders Students of Color from demonstrating their true talent).
10. This results in part from the racial composition of law school student bodies,
faculties and administrations.
11. See generally Timothy T. Clydesdale, A Forked River Runs Through Law School:
Toward Understanding Race, Gender, Age, and Related Gaps in Law School Performance and
Bar Passage, 29 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 711 (2004) (discussing racial unevenness’s impact on
academic outcomes in law school).
12. Most law schools evaluate students on a curve. A curve prescribes that student’s
grades, arguably the most determinant component of a law student’s dossier, are determined by
the quality of that student’s work relative to all other students.
13. See generally Tim Wise, Whites Swim in Racial Preference, ALTERNET (Feb. 20,
2003), http://academic.udayton.edu/race/04needs/affirm20.htm.
14. This focus on racial unevenness should not be misunderstood as a claim that other
dimensions of marginalization in law school (whether arising from axes of identity such as gender,
sexual orientation, socioeconomic status, age, or religion) are unimportant or less important than
that arising from race. For the DAC Survey’s first administration, we chose to focus on race.
Recognizing the limitations of any survey, we welcome and encourage further research that adds
to this report. For scholarship that has addressed other dimensions of unevenness in law school,
see, e.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Towards a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education, 11
NAT’L BLACK L.J. 1 (1989); Angela Mae Kupenda, On Teaching Constitutional Law When My
Race Is in Their Face, 21 LAW & INEQ. 215 (2003) (discussing the racial and gender unevenness
faced by female faculty of color); Brad Sears, Queer L, NAT’L L.J. SEXUAL ORIENTATION 234
(1995) (discussing the experience of law school as a gay, White male).
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undergraduate institutions,15 and gender unevenness at one elite law school.16
Among other findings, the survey reveals that UCLA Law’s Students of Color
face disproportionate levels of discrimination and marginalization when
compared to their White counterparts. Whereas Students of Color cite race as
central to their experience, White students overwhelmingly view race as a nonfactor in their legal education.
Before proceeding, we briefly quote from the Yale Law Women Speak Up
Report, which is part of an ongoing effort to better understand the impact of
gender dynamics at Yale Law School.17 The Report’s authors offer the
following thoughts:
In our adversarial legal system, evidence is marshaled to win arguments
and close cases. Speak Up and its thick record of quantitative and
qualitative data are intended to do something different. We share this
report with you to invigorate a conversation, not end it. We believe this is
the best way to honor the hard work of our predecessors and move toward
a satisfying future for everyone in our community. In that spirit of
openness, we invite you to read, to reflect, and of course, to speak up.18
We present this Article and the DAC Survey in the same spirit. The DAC
Survey is not the end of any conversation. It is only the beginning. If we are
lucky, it will be the beginning of a long, ambitious and robust conversation
about racial unevenness and corresponding interventions at UCLA Law and
beyond.
I.

RACIAL UNEVENNESS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
A. Racial Unevenness – A Basic Definition

For most Americans, “racism” remains a loaded term. The word has the
power to invoke powerful images of segregated schools, men in white hoods,
burning crosses and the many other manifestations of overt and invidious racial
discrimination that have plagued America. Due largely to changing national
norms and anti-discrimination legislation,19 however, overt discrimination has

	
  
	
  
15. See generally Shaun R. Harper & Sylvia Hurtado, Nine Themes in Campus Racial
Climates and Implications for Institutional Transformation, RESPONDING TO THE REALITIES OF
RACE ON CAMPUS: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR STUDENT SERVICES (S. R. Harper & L. D. Patton, eds.
2007) (discussing fifteen years of research on racially hostile learning environments on
undergraduate campuses).
16. See Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women’s Experiences at One Ivy
League Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1994) (observing how gender influenced the
experience of students at University of Pennsylvania Law School).
17. Preface, YALE LAW WOMEN, YALE LAW SCHOOL FACULTY & STUDENTS SPEAK UP
ABOUT GENDER: TEN YEARS LATER (2012).
18. Id.
19. E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as
42 U.S.C. ch. 21 (2006)).

	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  

	
  

	
  

76

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 15:1

greatly declined.20 Notwithstanding this decline in overt discrimination, subtle
forms of discriminatory treatment21 and environmental forces independent from
conduct continue to exact unique burdens upon People of Color because of
their race.22 But since these burdens are not the product of overt discrimination,
unburdened individuals rarely recognize their presence and associated harm.23
Counterintuitively, these new forms of covert racism are potentially more
insidious than their overt predecessors.24 Their “invisible” nature coupled with
our traditional understanding of racism creates challenges for those who
attempt to capture and analyze these modern race-dependent harms.25
Confronting this challenge, scholars have developed concepts such as racial
microaggressions and racial climate to describe and expose the “subtle,
nebulous, and unnamed nature” of modern racism and the way in which
environmental forces affect “the educational experiences and outcomes of
Students of Color.”26 Others, situated primarily within the tradition of Critical
Race Theory, continue to interrogate the way in which implicit biases, 27

	
  
20. Even in the absence of overt and intentional discrimination, if we define
discrimination as occurring anytime a perceiver treats a target in a particular way because of the
target’s race, there remains strong evidence that discriminatory treatment continues to exist. See
Kang, Fair Measures, supra note 1; Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness:
Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465 (2010); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118
HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005) [hereinafter Kang, Trojan Horses].
21. See Sue et al., supra note 9, at 271 (“[R]acism (a) is more likely than ever to be
disguised and covert and (b) has evolved from the ‘old fashioned’ form, in which overt racial
hatred and bigotry consciously and publicly displayed, to a more ambiguous and nebulous form
that is more difficult to identify and acknowledge.”).
22. See infra Part I.B.ii.3 (discussing the impact of stereotype threat and other burdens
that arise from environmental factors). As early as 1974, psychologist Chester Pierce implored
that “one must not look for the gross and obvious. The subtle, cumulative miniassault is the
substance of today’s racism.” Chester M. Pierce, Psychiatric Problems of the Black Minority, in
AMER. HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 516 (S. Arieti ed. 1974).
23. This invisibility should not necessarily surprise us. President Clinton’s Race
Advisory Board concluded that, inter alia, many White Americans remain unaware of the
privilege they enjoy in America and how their behavior discriminates against People of Color. See
JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN ET AL., PRESIDENT’S INITIATIVE ON RACE, ONE AMERICA IN THE 21ST
CENTURY (1998), available at http://clinton2.nara.gov/Initiatives/OneAmerica/PIR.pdf.
24. See, e.g., Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1745, 1752 (1989) (“[A]lthough the overt forms of racial domination described thus far were
enormously destructive, covert color bars have been, in a certain sense, even more insidious. After
all, judgments based on expressly racist criteria make no pretences about evaluating the merit of
the individual’s work. Far more cruel are racially prejudiced judgments that are rationalized in
terms of meritocratic standards.”); Solórzano, supra note 9, at 60–73; Derald Wing Sue,
OVERCOMING OUR RACISM: THE JOURNEY TO LIBERATION (2003) (“The ‘new’ manifestation of
racism has been likened to carbon monoxide, invisible, but potentially lethal.”).
25. Scholars have noted that “[w]ithout an adequate classification or understanding of
the dynamics of subtle racism, it will remain invisible and potentially harmful to the well-being,
self-esteem, and standard of living of people of color.” Sue et al., supra note 9, at 272.
26. Id.; Solórzano, supra note 9, at 16.
27.
See generally Kang, Fair Measures, supra note 1; Jerry Kang et al., Are Ideal
Litigators White? Measuring the Myth of Colorblindness, 7 J. EMPERICAL LEGAL STUD. 886
(2010) [hereinafter Kang, Are Ideal Litigators White?].
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institutional and societal forces28 and identity,29 among other things, perpetuate
racial oppression in the America. Joining this work, we introduce racial
unevenness as a concept that will help us understand and unveil how race
remains embedded in our institutions and our daily lives.
At a basic level, racial unevenness refers to the presence of any burden
that arises solely because of a person’s race. Had this person belonged to a
different race, she would not have confronted this burden. Relevant burdens
range from the most overt racism to the far more difficult to identify, subtle and
seemingly mundane harms unattributable to any perpetrator.30 Since only some
members within a community bear the weight of racial unevenness, it functions
as a racial tax.31 In American society, People of Color most often bear this
tax;32 it is a tax Whites almost never have to pay.
When discussing racial unevenness, we employ “raced” and
“race-normed” to differentiate between the individuals that do and do not bear
the burden of unevenness in a given setting. The notion of “racing” is derived
from Jerry Kang’s model of racial mechanics.33 Under Kang’s model, race is
the product of a series of processes. The first step consists of an encounter
involving a perceiver and a target; the perceiver relies on a set of mapping rules
and racial schemas to map the target into a particular racial category.34
Schemas, which guide this mapping, are mental “templates of knowledge that
help us organize specific examples into broader categories.”35 For instance, at a
young age we learn to recognize “something with a seat, back, and legs . . . as a
chair.”36 Without expending valuable mental resources, we simply sit down.37

	
  
28. See, e.g., Devon M. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
1259 (2000) [hereinafter Carbado, Working Identity]; Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106
Harv. L. Rev. 1709 (1993).
29.
See, e.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991) (introducing the
concept of intersectionality); Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
1093 (2008).
30. Such moments and the ensuing negative consequences can result from good
intentions. See Cecil J. Hunt, Guests in Another’s House: An Analysis of Racially Disparate Bar
Performance, 23 FL. ST. U. L. REV. 721, 771–72 (1996) (describing a faculty member’s decision
not to call on Students of Color because of the students’ perceived vulnerability).
31. Cf. Claude M. Steele, Expert Report, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN (Jan. 15, 2011),
http://www.vpcomm.umich.edu/admissions/legal/expert/steele.html
(“[Stereotype-threatened
students] pay an extra tax on their investment there, a ‘pioneer tax,’ if you will, of worry and
vigilance that their futures will be compromised by the ways society perceives and treats their
group. And it is paid everyday, in every stereotype-relevant situation.”).
32. Id.
33. See Kang, Trojan Horses, supra note 20, at 1500.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.; see also Kang, Are Ideal Litigators White?, supra note 27, at 888 (2010).
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Such processes enable us to constantly digest large quantities of information
without expending too many cognitive resources.38
Schemas apply to most things we encounter in our lives, such as other
human beings. As with a chair, a set of mapping rules helps us subconsciously
identify and categorize people. Instead of cuing on a seat, back, and legs,
placement in racial categories depends on characteristics such as phenotype,
accent, or skin color.39 Once mapped into a particular racial category, presence
in that category triggers an associated racial meaning.40 Racial meanings can
take the form of stereotypes or attitudes.41 A stereotype involves particular
traits that we associate with a racial group, such as foreign, criminal, or good at
math.42 An attitude involves an evaluative feeling about a group, such as like,
dislike, fear, or admiration.43 While related, attitudes and stereotypes are
distinct. For instance, a person may hold positive stereotypes about Asians and
math but simultaneously hold a negative attitude about the racial group. The
particular racial meaning ultimately affects the perceiver’s behavior vis-à-vis
the target.
By describing only some individuals as raced, we depart slightly from this
model. As described above, due to racial schemas, all people are mapped into a
particular racial group, which then triggers associated racial meaning. We
contrast “raced” with “race-normed” to emphasize that the burdens associated
with racial unevenness most often arise as a result of an individual’s distance
from the racial norm. In situations where whiteness is the norm, White
individuals are still mapped (or raced) into a racial category. However, there is
no burden associated with this mapping because it occurs with respect to a
White baseline (i.e. White is normal). It is as if the White individual has no
race, a phenomenon often referred to as white transparency.44 For this reason,
we refer to Whites in such contexts as race-normed. By contrast, the moment
someone is mapped into a non-White racial group, that distance from the racial
norm has the potential to create an incipient burden, or unevenness. A Person
of Color is thereby raced.
Whiteness is not inherently the racial baseline. Depending on context,
racial unevenness sometimes manifests in a way that burdens Whites. For
instance, within a college class on Asian Studies, with an Asian-American
professor and a majority of Asian-American students, Asians may be race	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  
38. See Kang, Trojan Horses, supra note 20.
39. Id. at 1500.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”: White Race Consciousness
and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953 (1993); Wise, supra note 13.
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normed and non-Asians may be raced.45 The NBA, where blackness is arguably
the norm, provides another example. In such a space, a White or Asian
basketball player is vulnerable to race-dependent challenges that his Black
teammates may never face. One recent example is Jeremy Lin, who became the
fourth Asian-American to play in the NBA 2010.46 The media thoroughly
commented on the race-dependent burdens Lin faced during his tenure with the
New York Knicks in 2012.47
Racial unevenness and its effect on students is complicated by the often
complex and multifaceted nature of identity. Beyond race, unevenness arises as
a result of characteristics such as gender, sexual orientation and socioeconomic status. An individual’s identity in any of these social categories could
create particular burdens unrelated to her inherent talent or abilities. Due to the
intersectional nature of our identities, many of us may simultaneously fall
within and outside of the norm. Constant across each domain, the particular
form of unevenness results from distance from the norm, whether it is male,
straight or middle-class. Ultimately, any unevenness proceeds with the same
logic: Assuming all other characteristics are equal, difference along a particular
axis will privilege one and burden another.

45. Claude Steele provides a similar example of a White student in an African-American
political science class. Within this particular space, where blackness was arguably the baseline as
a result of the overwhelming majority of Black students and the substance of the curriculum, the
White student acutely felt the weight and presence of his race in a way that did not occur in other
classrooms. See CLAUDE STEELE, WHISTLING VIVALDI: AND OTHER CLUES TO HOW
STEREOTYPES AFFECT US 85–89 (2010) [hereinafter STEELE, WHISTLING VIVALDI]. In either
example, societal stereotypes about Asian or Black students could still penetrate the interior of the
classroom and impact behavior and perceptions. Still, the presence of a large majority of AsianAmerican or Black students and an explicitly Asian-centric or African-American-centric
curriculum would likely be sufficient to shift the default racial norm away from its White baseline.
46. See, e.g., Asian American – Sports – Basketball, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asian_American (last visited March 3, 2013); Devin Gordon, The
Jeremy Lin Debate No One Wants to Have, GQ.COM
(July 19, 2012),
http://www.gq.com/blogs/the-q/2012/07/the-jeremy-lin-debate-no-one-wants-to-have.html; Devin
Gordon, Jeremy Lin, Carmelo Anthony and Race: An Alternate Viewpoint, GQ.COM (July 20,
2012),
http://www.gq.com/blogs/the-q/2012/07/jeremy-lin-carmelo-anthony-and-race-analternate-viewpoint.html; Jay Caspian Kang, A Question of Identity: The headline, the tweet, and
the
unfair
significance
of
Jeremy
Lin,
GRANTLAND
(Feb.
22,
2012),
http://www.grantland.com/story/_/id/7601157/the-headline-tweet-unfair-significance-jeremy-lin.
47. Some may argue that if racial unevenness compels a racial remedy (i.e. affirmative
action) in certain contexts, then intellectual consistency demands that we support raceconsciousness “admissions” in the NBA (or hypothetically in a mathematics doctoral program
where Asian students outnumber Whites). Although racial unevenness may burden Whites to a
certain degree in these settings, the situations are not parallel. For instance, whereas People of
Color faced explicitly discriminatory policies that formally limited their ability to access
institutions such as the NBA and higher education, Whites have rarely faced formal or informal
exclusion in the United States. This distinction, among others, cautions against assuming that the
presence of racial unevenness in itself is sufficient to warrant intervention.

	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  
80

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 15:1

	
  

	
  
	
  

	
  

B. Racial Unevenness – A Taxonomy
All manifestations of racial unevenness exist at a particular point within
two, at times overlapping, spheres. The first sphere comprises all forms of
racial unevenness that arise when an individual is treated differently by another
person, group, or institution because of her race. The second sphere, in contrast,
encompasses manifestations of racial unevenness that arise from environmental
factors and institutional culture in the absence of disparate treatment.
This disaggregation of racial unevenness maps closely onto established
models of discrimination that distinguish between disparate treatment and
disparate impact.48 Under these traditional models, disparate treatment exists
anytime a perpetrator treats a victim differently because of the victim’s race.49
The unlawful harm is the perpetrator’s discriminatory behavior, which is
motivated by invidious, as opposed to rational, non-racist grounds.50 Disparate
impact, in contrast, exists whenever there is a disparate racial outcome.51 The
harm is the disparity itself, unrelated to the presence or absence of an
identifiable perpetrator.52
Though similar, our formulation of racial unevenness diverges slightly
from these past models. Formally, the disparate treatment sphere of racial
unevenness is identical to that described above. However, by including
behavior that results from implicit bias (e.g. “unintentional” discriminatory
treatment), our disparate treatment sphere extends beyond traditional
articulations of disparate treatment that demand evidence of an “intentional”
act.
Racial unevenness’s second sphere encompasses a space that is
simultaneously broader and narrower than traditional articulations of disparate

	
  
48. Disparate treatment theory formally entered the Supreme Court’s equal protection
jurisprudence in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that cognizable equal
protection claims required a showing of discriminatory intent even in the presence of profound
disparate impact). Prior to Davis, the Supreme Court had recognized cognizable Title VII claims
of discrimination in the absence of discriminatory intent. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 432 (1971) (“The Company’s lack of discriminatory intent is suggested by special efforts to
help the undereducated employees through Company financing of two-thirds the cost of tuition for
high school training. But Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of
employment practices, not simply the motivation.”) (emphasis omitted).
49.
Alan Freeman has described this conception of discrimination as the “perpetrator
perspective” because of the prerequisite existence of an identifiable perpetrator. See Alan David
Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review
of Supreme Court Doctrine, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT
FORMED THE MOVEMENT 29 (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
50. See Laurence H. Tribe, Making Sense of the Equal Protection Clause: A Right Not to
Be Subjugated, AM. CONST. L. 1514, 1515 (2d ed. 1988).
51.
Disparate impact theory has alternatively been described as the “anti-subjugation
theory” and “victim perspective.” Although all slightly nuanced, each model of discrimination
focuses on the victim’s experience and recognizes race-based harm in the absence of an
identifiable perpetrator.
52. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
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impact. It is broader because race-dependent burdens can exist even in the
absence of racially disparate outcomes. Students of Color, for instance, could
be just as successful as their White counterparts even in the presence of racedependent burdens. The second sphere is simultaneously narrower because the
presence of a racially disparate outcome does not guarantee the presence of
racial unevenness. This mismatch arises because racial unevenness, as we have
defined it, refers to race-dependent burdens at the individual level.53 Even if no
such burdens exist, a disparate outcome could conceivably arise. Still, in most
instances individual experiences will track group outcomes. Disparate
outcomes therefore provide relevant evidence of race-dependent burdens, and
thus racial unevenness. By focusing on the burden at the level of the individual,
as opposed to its cause or group-wide effect, the second sphere maps more
closely onto a “victim”54 or “anti-subordination”55 perspective, both of which
conceive of discrimination in terms of harm suffered.
1. Disparate Treatment: Intentional and Unintentional Discrimination

	
  

As described above, racial unevenness’s first sphere encompasses burdens
that arise from disparate treatment by another person, group, or institution.
Disparate treatment arises in various ways, spanning interpersonal interactions
to institutional policies or practices. Although we often understand
discrimination in terms of negative treatment, racial unevenness exists even if
the race-dependent treatment is positive. This “boost,” by privileging some
individuals over others because of their race, creates a race-dependent burden.56
And since racial unevenness refers to race-dependent harm, disparate
treatment is problematic regardless of the perpetrator’s underlying intent; racial
unevenness exists whether or not it is the product of intentional and invidious,
or unintentional and subconscious, behavior. To differentiate between these
forms of disparate treatment, we focus on whether explicit or implicit bias
caused the underlying discriminatory act.
Explicit and implicit biases arise from social cognitions.57 A cognition is a
thought or feeling, and “a social cognition is a thought or feeling about a person
or a social group, such as a racial group.”58 In our daily lives, most social
cognitions are implicit, which means they subconsciously and instantaneously
enter our minds.59 Cognitions are the product of racial schemas. As discussed

	
  
53. This is not to say that racial unevenness does not also operate at the group level. For
purposes of this Article, however, we narrow our lens to manifestations of racial unevenness at the
level of the individual.
54. See Freeman, supra note 49.
55. See Tribe, supra note 50, at 1515.
56. See Kang, Trojan Horses, supra note 20.
57. See id. at 887; Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV.
1124, 1128 (2012) [hereinafter Kang, Implicit Bias].
58. Kang, Trojan Horses, supra note 20.
59. Id.
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above, racial schemas allow us to quickly process large amounts of information
by organizing particular things or people into broader categories.60 As a result
of racial schemas and implicit cognitions, we automatically place individuals
into racial categories that trigger associated attitudes and stereotypes.61
“Explicit” connotes that the cognition is “consciously accessible through
introspection and endorsed as appropriate by the person who possesses” it.62
Salient examples of behavior arising from explicit bias include Jim Crow laws,
Japanese Internment, racially motivated hate crimes, racially restrictive housing
covenants, and voter gerrymandering.63 In each instance, the decision maker
(perceiver) is consciously treating one group differently than another because
of race. Most often, the perceiver endorses the stereotype or attitude driving the
decision. Historically, models of human behavior presumed that our attitudes
and stereotypes about racial groups were the product of these explicit biases.64
Implicit biases, in contrast, comprise attitudes and stereotypes that are
inaccessible through self-inspection.65 The perceiver, who may not endorse the
stereotype or attitude if made aware of its existence, is often unaware of, or
mistaken about, the source of the bias and its influence on behavior.66 We may
honestly believe that we view a particular group positively without realizing
that we implicitly hold negative attitudes or stereotypes about that same
group.67 Since implicit biases can directly impact behavior, however, narrow

	
  
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Kang, Implicit Bias, supra note 57, at 1129.
63. We categorize these examples as the product of explicit bias because the relevant
decisions makers would be able to identify the racially inflected motivations driving their
behavior. In upholding the curfew and exclusion of Japanese Americans, for instance, the Court
never claimed an absence of intentional discrimination.
Rather, the Court consistently
differentiated between presumptively unconstitutional racial antagonism (understood as pure,
irrational racial hostility) and a more lawful “common sense” racial profiling. See Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (“Distinctions between citizens solely because of their
ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people . . . For that reason, legislative
classification or discrimination based on race alone has often been held to be a denial of equal
protection. We may assume that these considerations would be controlling here were it not for the
fact that the danger of espionage and sabotage, in time of war and of threatened invasion, calls
upon the military authorities to scrutinize every relevant fact bearing on the loyalty of populations
in the danger areas.”); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944) (“To cast this case
into the outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the real military dangers which were
presented merely confuses the issue. Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because
of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire
. . .”).
64. See Kang, Implicit Bias, supra note 57, at 1129.
65. See id. at 1129–31.
66. See Kang, Are Ideal Litigators White?, supra note 37, at 887.
67. See id.; cf. Jonathan Feingold & Karen Lorang, Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias,
59 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 210 (2012) (discussing how we may be unaware of our own biases, yet
such biases can still impact our behavior).
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conceptions of disparate treatment that account for intentional discrimination
only fail to embody the entire breadth of race-dependent treatment.68
2. Institutional Culture and Perceiver Effects
Racial unevenness’s second sphere, which we generally refer to as
institutional culture, comprises all race-dependent burdens that are not a
consequence of disparate treatment. These forms of racial unevenness can arise
from personal interactions, but are also commonly the product of
environmental factors. Since environmental factors will change across settings,
racial unevenness could vary within a single institution.69
Arising from scholarship concerning the relationship between institutional
forces and the experience of Students of Color in higher education, the term
“campus racial climate”70 has emerged to describe the degree to which
institutions provide welcoming spaces in which Students of Color feel like
equal members of the campus community.71 The presence of a positive racial
climate reduces racial unevenness and positively impacts the academic
outcomes of Students of Color.72 In contrast, a racially hostile climate can
exacerbate racial unevenness and contribute to the mental anguish and
academic underperformance of Students of Color.73 Presence in such an
environment has been described as being a “guest in another’s house,”74 a
metaphor that reflects how Students of Color, although putative equals to their
White counterparts, may feel that they “are not actually treated as legitimate
members of the law school community.”75

	
  
68. See Kang, Implicit Bias, supra note 57.
69. For instance, even across classrooms the particular manifestation of racial
unevenness likely depends on the race of the instructor, the racial composition of the students and
the subject matter of the course. While Latino students may normally feel particular burdens in a
first-year property course, racial unevenness may shift to a White student who finds herself as a
token in a class on Latinos and the law.
70. See generally Harper & Hurtado, supra note 15 (conducting a meta-analysis on
campus racial climate research gathered between 1992 and 2007).
71. Solórzano, supra note 9, at 62.
72. See id. at 63.
73. Id. This use of the term “hostile” to describe negative campus racial environments
does suggest that such institutions intentionally create uninviting environments. The phrase is a
term of art that describes experience, not intentions or motives. As suggested by DAC Survey’s
finding, see infra Part III, racially hostile climates may exist even at institutions that actively
attempt to create a positive racial climate.
74. Hunt, supra note 30, at 774.
75. Id.; see also Walter Allen & Daniel Solórzano, Affirmative Action, Educational
Equity and Campus Racial Climate: A Case Study of the University of Michigan Law School, 12
LA RAZA L.J. 237, 246 (2001).
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A multitude of factors impact an institution’s campus racial climate, none
of which are independently determinative.76 Relevant factors include: (1)
personal interactions; (2) the racial composition of students, faculty and
administrators; (3) the degree to which People of Color are included in campus
activities; (4) the institution’s commitment to diversity and pluralism; (5)
responsiveness to the needs and concerns of Students of Color; (6) the breadth
of courses offered, (7) the general ideological disposition of members of the
community; and (7) the physical space (including decorations and images on
the wall).77 Internal contradictions also have the ability to impact campus racial
climate. For instance, even though formally rejected, lingering and pervasive
stereotypes regarding the intellectual inferiority of Students of Color, especially
Black and Latina/o students, remain prominent at many institutions.78 In the
presence of such stereotypes, racial unevenness can become particularly acute
when an institution’s claim and self-presentation of racial inclusiveness is
juxtaposed with a failure to adequately address student concerns.
(1) Racial Demographics

	
  

Since an institution’s racial composition affects the racial norm, a law
school’s racial demographics will directly impact levels of racial unevenness,
and as a consequence, students’ experience. Students of Color remain
underrepresented in most elite American law schools, which remain more than
60% White.79 In such institutions, which continue to house large majorities of
White male faculty and administrators, particular classrooms may contain no
more than one or two Students of Color. For these students, simply existing as a
racial token can produce a race-dependent harm that race-normed students

	
  
	
  
	
  
76. See Daniel G. Solórzano et al., Keeping Race in Place: Racial Microaggressions and
Campus Racial Climate at the University of California, Berkeley, 23 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV.
15, 16 (2002).
77. See Tara J. Yosso et al., Critical Race Theory, Racial Microaggressions, and
Campus Racial Climate for Latina/o Undergraduates, 79 HARV. EDU. REV. 659, 672 (2009)
(“Students’ physical world also elicits cultural alienation, featuring campus sculptures, buildings,
flyers, and office postings that do not reflect Chicana/o histories or experiences. The cars and
clothes of the predominately White student body further evidence the physical reproduction of
White middle-class culture.”).
78. Id.; cf. RICHARD HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE (1994);
Richard H. Sander, A Systematic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57
STAN. L. REV. 367 (2004).
79. Admissions statistics as reported on law schools’ websites. See, e.g., HLS Profile
and
Facts,
HARVARD
LAW
SCHOOL
(Sept.
21,
2012),
http://www.law.harvard.edu/prospective/jd/apply/classprofile.html (reporting 39% Students of
Color for class of 2015); Admissions, YALE LAW SCHOOL (Oct. 7, 2012),
http://www.law.yale.edu/admissions/admissions.htm (reporting 32% Students of Color for class
of 2015); J.D. Admissions – Experience, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL (Oct. 7, 2012)
http://web.law.columbia.edu/admissions/jd/experience/class-profile (reporting 38% Students of
Color for the Class of 2015).
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never confront.80 The experience of existing as a token has been described in
the following way:
A is the only Black student taking Medieval Literature; he is likely to feel
like, and to be perceived as, “the Black kid” in the class. When B is the only
woman majoring in Mechanical Engineering, she is likely to feel like, and to be
perceived as, not just an Engineering major, but a woman majoring in
Engineering. But when there are multiple members of one’s racial or gender
group present, a person’s identity is less defined by group membership. Now A
is just a student taking Medieval Literature and B is just someone studying
Engineering.81
This description reflects tokenism’s most common consequences:
distortion of individual characteristics, racial polarization, and supervisibility.82 Distortion refers to the tendency of majority group members to
impose stereotypes on minority group members while simultaneously failing to
accept behavior that challenges stereotypes.83 The related phenomenon of
polarization refers to increased salience gained by characteristics that
distinguish minority and majority group members even when such factors have
little connection to task performance.84 Super-visibility refers to the
phenomenon whereby tokens are “over-observed.”85
In the law school context, super-visibility manifests as a double-edged
sword; token status produces the dual phenomena of hyper-invisibility and
hyper-visibility.86 Similar to other forms of racial unevenness, although hyperinvisibility and hyper-visibility is obvious to the person bearing its burden,
race-normed members of the class are rarely cognizant of such a phenomenon
until it is explicitly marked.87
Hyper-invisibility refers to the majority of class conversations in which
the professor and fellow (i.e. White) students act as if the Student of Color is

	
  

	
  
80. See, e.g., Eve Spangler et al., Token Woken: An Empirical Test of Kanter’s
Hypothesis, 84 AM. J. SOC. 160 (1978); Leonard Springer et al., Effects of Small-Group Learning
on Undergraduates in Science, Mathematics, Engineering, and Technology: A Meta-Analysis, 69
REV. EDU. RESEARCH 21 (1999); Egbert Harskamp et al., Group Composition and Its Effect on
Female and Male Problem-Solving in Science Education, 50 EDU. RESEARCH 307 (2008); see
also William J. McGuire et al., Salience of Ethnicity in the Spontaneous Self-Concept as a
Function of One’s Ethnic Distinctiveness in the Social Environment, 36 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL.
511 (1978).
81. See Brief of Experimental Psychologists. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Fisher v. University of Texas (August 13, 2012) (No. 01-1015).
82. See Spangler, supra note 80, at 162.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 161.
86. See generally Rita Sethi, Speaking Up! Speaking Out! The Power of Student Speech
in Law School Classrooms, 16 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 61, 63 (1994); Spangler, supra note 81, at
162.
87. See generally Sethi, supra note 86. Personal conversations commonly reveal that
White students are unaware of this phenomenon until it is explained to them.
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not present.88 Invisibility likely arises in part from lingering stereotypes about
Black and Latino intellectual ability. Whether explicit or implicit, these biases
manifest when a professor fails to actively solicit substantive input from
Students of Color. Even if avoidance is not the product of malice or explicit
biases, failure to engage students on an equal basis can be perceived as
demeaning and presumptive behavior that communicates that the professor
does not value each student’s contribution equally.89
Juxtaposed with hyper-invisibility, hyper-visibility refers to the attention
placed on Students of Color when race explicitly enters a conversation.90 Such
moments, in which all eyes seemingly turn to the Student of Color, produce
intersecting harms and a related “spokesperson pressure.”91 First, the student’s
ability to be heard as an individual is buried beneath the expectation that they
will speak on behalf of an entire group.92 Second, seeking input on “racial”
issues only communicates that the student’s contributions are limited to
discussions about race (the student’s apparent area of expertise).
Third,
regarding race as relevant only when directly invoked suggests that race is not
otherwise present or relevant to classroom discussions, a view that may conflict
with a student’s life experience.93
(2) Perceptive Divergence
Two individuals can occupy the same space and witness the same events,
yet perceive the event’s racial implications in profoundly different ways.94 This

	
  
	
  
88. See Solórzano, supra note 9, at 65 (observing that African American students
discussed feeling “invisible” in the classroom); see also Quaylan Allen, Racial Microaggressions:
The Schooling Experiences of Black Middle-Class Males in Arizona’s Secondary Schools, 1 J.
AFR. AM. MALES EDU.125, 130 (2010) (discussing hyper-invisibility and the experience of middle
class Black males in high school).
89. Hunt, supra note 30, at 774.
90. See Solórzano, supra note 9, at 27 (discussing a black student’s experience on the
UC-Berkeley undergraduate campus: “I am the only Black student in the classroom, a Black issue
comes up and I feel all eyes on me. They expect me to be their expert on Black people!
Sometimes I have to remind them that I had gone to the same White school system they went to,
and wasn’t taught about our history or psychology or anything. Just because I am black, they
expect that I know all about the African American experience”).
91. Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test
Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797 (1995).
92. Solórzano, supra note 9, at 69.
93.
Id. at 69–70; Valerie Purdie-Vaughns et al., Social Identity Contingencies: How
Diversity Cues Signal Threat or Safety for African Americans in Mainstream Institutions, 94 J.
PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 615 (2008)
94. Cf. Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air, 52 AM. PSYCHOL. 613, 613 (1997)
[hereinafter Steele, A Threat in the Air] (“From an observer’s standpoint, the situations of a boy
and a girl in a math classroom or of a Black student and a White student in any classroom are
essentially the same. The teacher is the same; the textbooks are the same; and in better classrooms,
these students are treated the same. Is it possible, then, that they could still experience the
classroom differently, so differently in fact as to significantly affect their performance and
achievement there?”).
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reality is often the reflection of perceptive divergence,95 whereby raced
individuals are more likely than race-normed individuals to be self-conscious of
their own race, view their own race as relevant to others’ perceptions of them,
and attribute race as a cause underlying a particular event.96 Independent of
actual disparate treatment, this heightened perception of race’s relevance is
sufficient to produce and exacerbate feelings of isolation, alienation, and
negative campus climate.97 For raced students at highly competitive law
schools, the burdens flowing from perceptive divergence constitute another
unique hurdle that their race-normed counterparts never face.
Perceptive divergence could be understood in various ways. First, it could
be evidence that raced individuals are better than their race-normed
counterparts at identifying racial bias.98 Under this view, which invokes claims
that those “on the bottom” have special and distinct insights about the
oppression they face, there is no difference between perceptive divergence and
disparate treatment; perceptive divergence simply reflects raced individuals’
better “racial bias-radar.”
Alternatively, perceptive divergence could be
evidence that raced individuals are oversensitive and inaccurately attribute race
to otherwise race-neutral events. Under this interpretation, the better “racial
bias-radar” belongs to race-normed individuals.
These dueling interpretations, by framing perceptive divergence as a
reflection of better or worse measures of objective reality, misdiagnose the
relevance of perceptive divergence. Perceptive harms, which are most likely to
afflict raced individuals, do not disappear simply because an individual
inaccurately interprets an incident to be the product of racial bias. The
perception of racial bias can produce a burden in itself, regardless of its basis in
“objective” truth. The two framings, therefore, are somewhat inapposite to the
more fundamental question of whether or not a race-dependent harm exists.
As previously mentioned, heightened racial self-consciousness forms the
core of perceptive divergence. This burden, which commonly manifest as
perceived hyper-visibility, is most likely to afflict raced individuals because

	
  
95.
Our conception of perceptive divergence tracks closely to Russell Robinson’s
articulation of perceptual segregation. See Robinson, supra note 29 (discussing how racial and
gender identities influence the way people perceive a moment of alleged discrimination).
96. Perceptive divergence can also arise when two people learn about a past incident. See
Robert S. Chang, Toward An Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, PostStructuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1241, 1274 n.153 (“I have noticed that
responses tended to vary depending on the gender and race of the listener. From my own
unscientific observations, I recognized that stories were often better received by people of color
and by women than by white men.”).
97. See Harper & Hurtado, supra note 15, at 13. Perceptions about racial climate have
been shown to affect students’ sense of belonging into their junior year of college. See Sylvia
Hurtado & Deborah F. Carter, Effects of College Transition and Perceptions of the Campus Racial
Climate on Latino College Students’ Sense of Belonging, 70 SOC. EDU. 324 (1997).
98. Cf. Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations,
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987).
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they fall outside of the racial norm. Although interpersonal interaction can
exacerbate racial self-consciousness, it is not a necessary predicate. Mere
presence as a racial other is often sufficient. Most readers can recall such an
experience.99 For some, especially People of Color living in the United States,
this may be a daily occurrence. For others, principally White Americans who
spend little time in spaces where Whites constitute a minority, it may be less
common. In fact, unless their own race is directly marked, race-normed
individuals are unlikely to ever experience racial self-consciousness.
The severity and impact of heightened racial self-consciousness depend
on many of the same factors that impact racial climate, such as a group’s racial
composition and the stereotypes that attach to the raced individual. Perceptive
divergence therefore will not impact Students of Color uniformly just because
they fall outside of the racial norm. The most salient stereotypes that attach to
Black and Latino students differ from those that attach to Asian students. As a
result, performance pressures and self-awareness may correspondingly differ.
Although Asian students may face stereotypes of foreignness or passivity,
Black and Latino students are more likely to battle a presumption of intellectual
inferiority. The presence of either stereotype may produce feelings of
marginalization and a depressed sense of belonging, but stereotypes affecting
Black and Latino students are more likely to erode students’ confidence in their
academic abilities.100 And even within a particular racial group, intra-group
differences will impact the degree to which heightened racial selfconsciousness burdens any individual.101
Beyond heightened racial self-consciousness, raced individuals are more
likely than their race-normed counterparts to perceive race as a causal factor
underlying negative interactions. This phenomenon—the tendency to attribute a
racial cause to a negative interaction—is known as stigma consciousness.102
Racial demographics and the prevalence of negative stereotypes directly impact

99. We imagine that many readers will be familiar with the phenomenon of heightened
racial self-consciousness. For those who are not, we recommend spending a few hours someplace
where you are a racial minority. You will likely be acutely aware of your race; this is the other
side of perceptive divergence.
100. See Solórzano, supra note 9, at 66; Sylvia Hurtado et al., Latino Student Transition
to College, 37 RES. HIGHER EDU. 135, 152 (1996) (“Even the most talented Latinos are likely to
have difficulty adjusting if they perceive a climate where majority students think all minorities are
special admits [and] Hispanics feel like they do not ‘fit in.’ . . . Students may internalize these
climate observations, presumably because these are more difficult to identify or sanction than
overt forms of discrimination.”); Sharon Fries-Britt & Bridget Turner, Facing Stereotypes: A Case
Study of Black Students on a White Campus, 42 J. COLLEGE STUDENT DEV. 420 (2001).
101.
An individual’s “blackness,” for instance, may impact her ability to combat and
maneuver through mechanisms of racial unevenness within an institution. See Devon W. Carbado
& G. Mitu Gulati, Race to the Top of the Corporate Ladder: What Minorities Do When they Get
There, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1643 (2004); Carbado, Working Identity, supra note 28.
102. Elizabeth Pinel et al., Getting There Is Only Half the Battle: Stigma Consciousness
and Maintaining Diversity in Higher Education, 61 J. SOC. ISSUES 481, 482 (2005).
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how strongly raced students believe such stereotypes inform their interactions
with out-group individuals.103 When stigma consciousness is high, Students of
Color are more likely than their White peers to perceive their institutions to be
racist and to associate feelings of alienation on campus with racial prejudice
and discrimination.104 Even when White students are aware of racial hostility
on campus, Students of Color tend to view campus climate more negatively.105
Since racial unevenness is likely to differ across racial groups, stigma
consciousness and perceptions of campus racial climate are likely to similarly
diverge.106
Heightened levels of stigma consciousness will also impact a student’s
ability to contend with racial microaggressions, which constitute the “brief,
everyday exchanges that send denigrating messages to people of color because
they belong to a racial minority group.”107 Since microaggressions are subtle in
nature – often the product of verbal exchanges, slight “snubs or dismissive

	
  
103. Id.
104. See Sylvia Hurtado, The Campus Racial Climate: Contexts of Climate, 63 J. HIGHER
EDU. 539, 546 (1992) (citing a study in which only 28% of Black and Chicano students perceived
the university as being supportive of minority students, while 68% of White students agreed that it
was); see also Harper & Hurtado, supra note 15, at 12 (citing S. R. Rankin & R. D. Reason,
Differing Perceptions: How Students of Color and White Students Perceive Campus Racial
Climate for Underrepresented Groups, 46 J. COLLEGE STUDENT DEV. 43 (2005)). In one 1993
study, contrary to the majority of sampled White students, “[a]lmost all of the sampled African
American students reported having borne the brunt of racist remarks and most assumed that
African Americans would be mistreated on campus.” Id. (citing Anthony R. D’Augelli & Scott L.
Hershberger, African American Undergraduates on a Predominantly White Campues: Academic
Factors, Social Networks, and Campus Climate, 62 J. NEGRO EDU. 67, 77 (1993)).
105. See Harper & Hurtado, supra note 15, at 12 (citing A. F. Cabrera & A. Nora, College
Students’ Perceptions of Prejudice and Discrimination and Their Feelings of Alienation: A
Construct Validation Approach, 16 REV. EDU./PEDAGOGY/CULTURAL STUD. 387 (1994); see also
Janet K. Swim et al., African American College Students’ Experiences with Everyday Racism:
Characteristics of and Responses to These Incidents, 29 J. BLACK PSYCHOL. 38 (2003) (observing
that 36% of participants reported unfriendly looks and skeptical stares, 24% percent reported
confronting derogatory and stereotypical verbal remarks, 18% reported bad service received in
settings on and off campus, and 15% reported other assorted incidents, including general rudeness
and awkward or nervous behavior on the part of Whites; with students attributing the foregoing
experiences to racism).
106. Hurtado, supra note 100, at 546 (highlighting a study that found that “Black students
were most likely to perceive a hostile racial climate on campus, but Hispanics were more likely
than white students to perceive such hostility”). This divergence is highlighted in a series of
studies in which Black students were consistently more likely than any other racial group to
“report lower levels of satisfaction with racial climates and perceive differential treatment on the
basis of race.” Harper & Hurtado, supra note 15, at 12.
107. See Sue et al., supra note 9, at 278 (“[M]icroaggressions (a) tend to be subtle,
indirect, and unintentional, (b) are most likely to emerge not when a behavior would look
prejudicial, but when other rationales can be offered for prejudicial behavior, and (c) occur when
Whites pretend not to notice differences, thereby justifying that ‘color’ was not involved in the
actions taken.”).
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looks, gestures, and tones” – perpetrators rarely recognize their harm.108 In
conjunction with the earnest belief that people are not racist and the availability
of non-biased justifications,109 perpetrators are often able to explain away
actual racial bias.110
Since perpetrators are often White, most have not experienced a litany of
racial microaggressions throughout their own lives. As a result, even if
perpetrators admit that an incident was racially motivated, they are likely to
deemphasize its severity.111 This response, which communicates that People of
Color are hypersensitive and should develop thicker skin, effectively denies the
relevance and probative value of the victim’s viewpoint.112 By reallocating
fault to the victim and delegitimizing the victim’s perspective, this behavior
exacerbates the incident’s initial harm.113
The subtle nature of racial microaggressions and the availability of
alternative explanations poses a different problem for victims. Whereas
perpetrators are able to dismiss race’s relevance, victims may struggle with
questions regarding whether they actually are overreacting and reading too
much into an innocent act.114 This identification challenge, which does not arise
from easily identifiable and categorizable acts of invidious discrimination,115
creates internal dilemmas that exacerbate and prolong a microaggression’s
initial harm.

	
  
108.
Id. Environmental conditions unrelated to treatment can also produce racial
microaggressions. For instance, though seemingly innocuous, a law school’s hallway display of
White male judges can send messages about who does and does not belong in the legal profession.
109.
For some White Americans, this self-trust exists alongside the belief that reverse
discrimination against Whites has eclipsed racism against People of Color. See Michael I. Norton
& Samuel R. Sommers, Whites See Racism as a Zero-Sum Game that they Are Now Losing, 6
PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 215 (2011); cf. Chang, supra note 96, at 1247 n.11 (1993) (describing a
1991 poll that “revealed that the majority of American voters believe that Asian Americans are not
discriminated against in the United States” and that “[s]ome even believe that Asian Americans
receive ‘too many special advantages’”).
110. See Sue et al., supra note 9, at 275. One could also argue that claims of racism
conflate racial bias with economic conservatism. To the extent such claims are warranted, it is
equally important not to conflate principled conservativism, in which racial outcomes correlate to
otherwise principled views, with modern racism, in which views are actually the product of racial
bias. See Song Hing et al., A Two-Dimensional Model that Employs Explicit and Implicit Attitudes
to Characterize Prejudice, 94 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 971 (2008).
111. See Sue et al., supra note 9.
112. See, e.g., Yosso, supra note 77, at 671 (“All too often, as this Latina anticipated,
when students spoke out against racial jokes, they found themselves on the defensive, responding
to accusations of being “complainers,” “whiners,” “too sensitive,” and not able to ‘take a joke.’”).
113. One Black female undergrad from Berkeley described the experience of selfsilencing in the following terms: “There are times when I want to be angry, but I don’t want to fall
into what they think every Black woman is and so a lot of times, I find myself restricted form
saying what I feel or doing what I feel because I don’t want to perpetuate negative stereotypes.”
Solórzano, supra note 9, at 42.
114. See Sue et al., supra note 9, at 278–79.
115. See Solórzano, supra note 9.
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(3) Stereotype Threat

	
  

Stereotype threat is another harm that can arise from environmental
factors even in the absence of disparate treatment. This phenomenon refers to
the “social-psychological threat that arises when one is in a situation or doing
something for which a negative stereotype about one’s group applies.”116
Stereotype threat is distinct from student disengagement and the internalization
of negative stereotypes. Rather, stereotype threat refers to the cognitive burden
that arises when an individual attempts to perform a challenging task when
failure would affirm a known negative stereotype about that individual’s group.
This threat, which only depresses performance when an individual is pushed to
the limit of her ability, most commonly affects the most talented within a
group.117
Due in part to stereotype threat, standardized tests and other common
measures of intellect consistently under-measure the intellectual ability of
individuals from racial groups that face negative stereotypes in academic
settings.118 This undermeasurement accounts for a significant portion of the
achievement gap that traditional explanations such as socioeconomic status or
preparation cannot account for.119
Since stereotype threat results from the “psychological context” in which
students perform academic tasks, the prevalence of negative stereotypes
alongside the severe underrepresentation of Latina/o and Black students in law
school is likely sufficient to produce high threat conditions.120 As such, timesensitive first-year examinations are likely to underestimate the talent of Black
and Latina/o students.121
Two seminal studies illustrate the effect and breadth of this phenomenon.
In one study, researchers administered a set of GRE questions to Black and
White Stanford University undergraduates.122 When researchers described the
questions as diagnostic of intellectual ability, thus priming a negative

	
  
116. Steele, A Threat in the Air, supra note 100, at 614. For a description of the cognitive
mechanism driving stereotype threat, see Toni Schmader, Michael Johns & Chad Forbes, An
Integrated Process Model of Stereotype Threat Effects on Performance, 115 Psychol. Rev. 336
(2008); Toni Schmader & Michael Johns, Converging Evidence that Stereotype Threat Reduces
Working Memory Capacity, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 440 (2003).
117. See STEELE, WHISTLING VIVALDI, supra note 45, at 56–59.
118. See Walton et al., supra note 1. Stereotype threat has been identified as causing as
much as a .25 standard deviation on some standardized tests for both women and Students of
Color. See Walton & Spencer, supra note 1, at 1137.
119. While most stereotype threat research has occurred in the laboratory setting, recent
findings support the hypothesis that stereotype threat extends to real world contexts. See Walton et
al., supra note 1, at 8–13 (discussing studies that support the assertion that stereotype threat
affects real world performance).
120. Id.
121. See Feingold, supra note 1, at 240 (discussing how first-year exams taken in high
threat environments have the potential to mismeasure the ability of Students of Color).
122. See Steele & Aronson, supra note 91.
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stereotype about Blacks, Black participants performed significantly worse than
their White counterparts.123 When the same questions were presented as a
problem solving experiment, thus removing the relevance of stereotypes
concerning intellectual ability, participants displayed no observable
disparity.124
In a later study, Asian American female students with high math ability
took a series of difficult math questions.125 Prior to answering the questions, the
students filled out one of three questionnaires that primed their gender
identities, primed their racial identities or primed no identity. The initial
priming enabled researchers to observe the interaction between performance
and a negative stereotype (women and math) as well as performance and a
positive stereotype (Asians and math).126 Priming a particular identity directly
impacted performance. Students in the control group answered on average 49%
of the questions correctly, students in the race-primed group answered 54%
correctly, and students from the gender-primed group answered only 43%
correctly.127 These findings illustrate the dynamic nature of stereotype threat; in
addition to negative stereotypes depressing academic performance, positive
stereotypes have the potential to boost performance.
II.

RACIAL UNEVENNESS IN LAW SCHOOL

Having unpacked the dimensions of racial unevenness, in this Part we
begin by explaining the high stakes of law school’s first-year exams. From
here, we analyze the most common manifestations of racial unevenness in
America’s top law schools. To be clear, we are not arguing that institutions
should accommodate certain students who cannot handle the rigor of law
school.128 There is great value in a professional school environment that
demands excellence from its students. For many students, regardless of race,
law school presents an immensely trying and traumatic experience. Racial
unevenness changes this baseline by injecting a layer of difference into an
already highly competitive and challenging educational environment. These
race-dependent burdens, which White students do not face, create obstacles
above and beyond the law school’s baseline challenges.

	
  
123. Id. at 799-802.
124. Id.
125. Margaret Shih, Todd L. Pittinsky & Nalini Ambady, Stereotype Susceptibility:
Identity Salience and Shifts in Quantitative Performance, 10 PSYCHOL. SCI. 80 (1999).
126. Id. at 80–82
127. Id. at 80.
128. Although racial unevenness has little do with the baseline difficulty of a particular
task, it is most likely to produce disparate results on difficult tasks. Cf. Walton et al., supra note 1
(explaining that stereotype threat is likely to impact performance only when an individual is
pushed to the limits of her ability).
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There is nothing novel about the claim that race-dependent harms pervade
law school. One prior articulation described law school as:
a forked river, with one side offering a challenging and often dangerous
white-water rapids course, the other side a swift but smooth current. . .
All minority law students are made to ride the former, and they are often
joined by older law students, law students with physical or learning
disabilities, and law students from disadvantaged socioeconomic
origins.129
A. The Stakes - Pathways and Prerequisites
In many educational environments, students receive a variety of feedback
and evaluation throughout the life of a particular course. Feedback commonly
comes in the form of shorter assignments, quizzes or midterm examinations. By
contrast, most American law schools provide no student evaluation outside of a
single, final exam. This format is common in most first-year courses, which are
pre-assigned to students and involve subject matter that is nearly uniform
across accredited law schools. As a consequence, a student’s first year GPA
usually is based solely on two or three sets of final exams, depending on
whether the school operates on a semester or quarter schedule. Furthermore, a
strict grading curve – especially in the first year – limits the number of As and
Bs a professor can give.130 Since GPA is often the first thing a potential
employer looks at, perhaps in conjunction with the student’s law school, final
exams heavily determine a student’s initial career opportunities.
Beginning with a student’s first semester, and especially following the
first year, final exam grades place students on a particular track. A student’s
track determines the ease with she is able to “win” at law school. For purposes
of this Article, we define “win” as the ability to access law school’s most
coveted resources and rewards. These resources and rewards become
immediately self-perpetuating; early resources and rewards are prerequisites for
the later, more coveted prizes. Failing to win early-on does not eliminate a
student’s ability to access a later prize, but early victories make later prizes
significantly easier to obtain. A student’s early success thus largely determines
their law school destiny.
The most coveted prizes include (more or less in chronological order):
joining a study group; 131 first semester grades; first year grades; membership

	
  
	
  
129. Clydesdale, supra note 11, at 712.
130. See BRIAN TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 96 (2012).
131.
See, e.g., Solórzano, supra note 9, at 66–67 (discussing the prevalence of low
expectations even in the face of contradictory evidence and students’ frustration in attempting to
find study group partners at the undergraduate level); Hunt, supra note 30. Study groups, similar
to the subsequent prizes, are a highly valued and sought-after law school commodity. Many
students believe academic success in law school depends in part on the ability to gain entry into a
strong study group. Study groups intersect with racial unevenness because the politics and
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on law review; second-summer job at an elite, high-paying, large law firm; a
clerkship for a federal (appellate) judge; a prestigious fellowship; an associate
position at that same elite, high-paying, large law firm; and potentially a future
position as law faculty. Each prize is either a means or an end to the ultimate
goals of money and power.132
The significance of first-semester and first-year grades cannot be
understated. The traditional second summer of law school is spent at a large
law firm. Most interviewing and hiring for these positions occurs during the fall
of the second year. Thus, employers are looking primarily at students’ first-year
GPAs. The majority of large firms (and other employers) uses GPA as a
guidepost, if not a threshold.133 First-year grades are the gatekeepers that
determine which students can get in the door.
In addition to grades, many employers highly value student membership
on an institution’s flagship law journal.134 This view arises in part from the
common perception that membership on such journals signals something about
a student’s ability and talent. However, access to the most coveted journals is
often related to a student’s first year grades. Even when first-year grades are
not determinative for all students,135 there is often a correlation between first
year grades and journal membership. Membership on a school’s flagship
journal provides access to power and opportunity within and outside of law
school. Much of this power originates from the prestige associated with journal
membership. Internal power derives from the special privileges, access to
resources, and physical space that journal membership entails. Externally,
journals provide access to exclusive alumni networks and coveted career
opportunities.
Beyond access to competitive law firms, journal membership acts as a
direct conduit, and in many cases a necessary prerequisite, to federal clerkships.
Among law school’s various competitions, the quest for federal clerkships is
	
  

	
  
	
  
negotiation that goes into the formation of study groups have the potential to communicate
underlying assumptions about who is, and who is not, likely to finish at the top of the class
132. We recognize that many individuals enter law school without the goal of gaining
high earning power. Many students enter premier law schools specifically intending to enter the
public sector or engage in public interest work. As such, the above formula is underinclusive in
terms of students’ entering interests and desires as well as some of the prizes sought. However,
although personal, ideological and political commitments will vary, the ability to realize one’s
goals is directly related to one’s individual power, which arises in large part from a law school
resume. Regardless of the sphere one wishes to enter, GPA plays a determinative role in providing
access and opening doors.
133. Some law firms use a GPA floor, below which they will rarely consider an applicant.
134. Legal scholarship is published through student-run law journals. Although most law
schools have a variety of journals, the institution’s flagship journal (often referred to as the “Law
Review”) is by far the most prestigious. Student membership on secondary journals carries far less
weight.
135. Some schools, such as UCLA Law, make grades relevant for only a portion of
students.
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perhaps the most competitive. The prestige of a federal appellate court
clerkship is difficult to match in the legal community. Such clerkships,
especially at the appellate level, often provide unmatched experience alongside
access to more coveted prizes and positions. In the same way that membership
on a journal sets an otherwise identical resume apart, an appellate clerkship has
rather unparalleled signaling power. And again, it likely all began with a
student’s first-year grades.
Beyond signaling talent or merit to future employers, first-semester and
first-year grades indicate to students whether law school was the proper choice,
the proper fit, and whether “I belong here.” In an environment that is often
competitive and disorienting, early failure can erode students’ confidence and
sense of self. Compounded by racial unevenness, Students of Color who
experience academic disappointment may be particularly vulnerable to
disassociate from law school. In the aggregate, disassociation and related
underperformance may reproduce stereotypes about who does and does not
belong in a particular institution.
B. The Harm - A Temporal Framing

	
  

Assuming that racial unevenness is present during the first semester of
law school, Students of Color confront unique hurdles, and therefore must do
more to achieve the same result, than their White colleagues. With respect to
unevenness generally, the situation resembles that involving Anne and Dan
from our opening hypothetical. To understand the most common manifestations
of racial unevenness in law school, we employ the following temporal
framework: (1) the final exam, (2) before the final exam, and (3) after the final
exam.

	
  

1. The Final Exam
As described above, first-semester and first-year grades significantly
impact a student’s law school destiny. Since evaluation is limited to the final
exam, first-semester grades mark one of the first moments where the
measurable consequences of racial unevenness are likely to appear.136
In addition to race-dependent burdens that manifest prior to a final exam,
stereotype threat is likely to burden Black and Latino students during the exam
itself.
As described above, stereotype threat detrimentally impacts an
individual’s performance when undertaking a particular task to which a

	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
136. Disparate attrition rates may provide another means of measuring racial unevenness
in law schools.
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negative stereotype about her group applies.137 Law school final exams often
present the factors necessary to produce this psychological threat.
In relevant ways, law school exams are similar to tests such as the SAT
and MCAT, in which the effects of stereotype threat have been documented.138
First, law school finals are widely understood as evaluative of intellectual
ability. Second, negative stereotypes about the intellectual abilities of Black
and Latino students remain prevalent on law school campuses; students may
perceive that poor performance on an exam would confirm the negative
stereotype.139 Third, law school exams often involve novel and complex legal
problems and present students with incredible time constraints that resemble
the speeded nature of the SAT and LSAT. The impact of these factors, likely
sufficient to trigger stereotype threat, can become exacerbated in classrooms
with only a token number of Students of Color.140 Black and Latina/o students
who find themselves in such classrooms are therefore most prone to confront
stereotype threat and the racial harms it produces.

	
  
2. Before the Final Exam

	
  
	
  

The presence of racial unevenness prior the exam can exert its own,
significant harm, which Students of Color must overcome to enter the final
exam on equal footing with their White counterparts. This pre-exam racial
unevenness is symbolized by the two metaphorical rivers referenced above;
Students of Color must contend with white-water rapids while White students
enjoy a gentle current.
These rivers remain divergent in part due to the pervasive use of
traditional legal pedagogy, known as the case method, in first-year law school
classrooms. The case method, which has dominated American law schools
since Christopher Columbus Langdell introduced it to Harvard Law School in
the 1870’s, requires students to divine abstract legal principles from appellate
decisions.141 Langdell developed the case method in response to critiques that
lawyering and legal analysis were not serious and rigorous endeavors.142 The

	
  
137. Steele, A Threat in the Air, supra note 100, at 614. For a description of the cognitive
mechanism driving stereotype threat, see Schmader, An Integrated Process, supra note 116;
Schmader, Converging Evidence, supra note 116.
138. See id. at 13–15 (estimating the stereotype threat effect on the SAT).
139. See, e.g., Sander, supra note 78 (arguing that Black and Latino students who gain
admission to law school through race-conscious admissions policies are at a disadvantage because
they are academically inferior to their counterparts who were not admitted through such
programs); Kendra Fox-Davis, A Badge of Inferiority: One Law Student’s Story of a Racially
Hostile Educational Environment, 23 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 98 (2010) (describing the impact that
Sander’s mismatch theory had on the author’s law school experience).
140. Id.
141. Chang, supra note 96.
142. CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
(2d ed., 1999).
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case method, which attempts to frame law as a “scientific” endeavor, has
shrouded legal analysis under the veil of racial-neutrality ever since.
Although few would still argue that legal analysis actually occurs in a
perspectiveless vacuum, the presentation of legal doctrine continues to rely on
the assumption that the law has evolved, and continues to function, through
race-neutral legal principles. These principles, which students uncover in
appellate opinions, are presented as natural conclusions, unrelated to the
implicit and explicit racial biases and perspectives of the judges who developed
the law. However, since the judiciary has remained predominately White and
male, legal principles have been shaped by a particular racial (and gendered)
lens.143 This reality runs in tension with the articulation of legal analysis as an
objective endeavor in which one’s race is irrelevant to outcome.144
Presenting legal analysis as a race-neutral endeavor produces racial
unevenness in the following way: allegedly race-neutral legal principles dictate
what facts are relevant, sufficient or necessary to solve a particular legal
problem. Due largely to the legacy of a White (i.e. race-normed) judiciary, facts
about race and social context have been overwhelmingly marginalized to the
category of irrelevant evidence. “Objective” legal analysis provides little space
for the invocation of race.
One of a law student’s first challenges consists of learning how to
distinguish relevant and irrelevant facts. This task can pose heightened
challenges for students who understand the world and their lived experience
through a racially salient lens.145 Since traditional legal pedagogy has largely
exorcised race from “objective” legal analysis, students who attempt to inject
race into classroom conversations risk reprimand for adopting an
inappropriately “perspectived” approach. At a minimum, professors often
communicate that race is best relegated to an extra-legal discussion. Having

143. See Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1971 (1990).
144. See Chang, supra note 96 (“When the legal academy was made up exclusively of
white males, a legal scholar did not have to reveal the context from which he spoke because
everyone occupied the same context. This shared context fostered a false sense of acontextuality,
where one could pretend to be aperspectival because only one perspective was represented. With
the entry of women and persons of color into the legal academy and with their use of personal
narratives in scholarship, whether perspective matters has become a contested issue.”). This notion
of objectivity fails to recognize that “just as science has learned that the perspective of the
observer can not only affect, but can also determine, what is observed, law must also recognize the
importance of perspective.” Id.; see also Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional
Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17–19 (1989)
(“Difficult as it is to view the world from someone else’s perspective, not to make the effort is to
ignore what science learned long ago.”).
145. See generally Mari Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as
Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 7, 8 (1989) (discussing the “bifurcated
thinking” that women of color must engage in to achieve and be rewarded for “proper” legal
analysis).
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gone through the same training, many professors struggle to meaningfully
engage race even if they desire to do so.
Students entering law school with an interpretive lens that foregrounds
race (or another axis of identity) face various choices.146 They may engage in
“bifurcated thinking” by suppressing the worldview they have always known in
favor of a particular viewpoint deemed to be race-neutral and perspectiveless.
Even though many students are able to perform this task, the coerced
suppression of a race-conscious perspective is not without consequence.147 This
self-censoring privileges a particular perspective and may cause students to feel
silenced or to have “compromised” their true identity.148 Alternatively, those
students unable or unwilling to discard a race-conscious lens are left vulnerable
and exposed for abandoning a “race-neutral” viewpoint.149 Although it may
seem minor, this is another channel through which racial unevenness permeates
law school.
Exacerbating the effect of traditional legal pedagogy are certain
interpretive legal frameworks, such as Colorblindness, that expressly reject
race’s relevance to legal analysis. Taken to the extreme, proponents of
Colorblindness claim that the Constitution forbids the government from ever
taking race into account.150 This view is rooted in a formal conception of
race;151 race is nothing more than skin color, unrelated to disparate outcomes or
societal marginalization and subordination. Formal race manifests in statements

146. This unevenness need not occur strictly along racial lines. Not all Students of Color
will have experienced race as a salient component of their identity. Nor will all White students
have lived a life free from racial consciousness. Thus, this particular form of unevenness arising
from legal pedagogy is arguably race-neutral. However, since Students of Color are more likely to
bring a race-conscious perspective to class, they are more likely to suffer this burden.
147. As Chang states, “[i]n this way, rules of evidence silence us. In order to get our
stories into evidence, we need to broaden or change the very meaning of evidence.” Chang, supra
note 96, at 172.
148. Id.; see also Carbado, Working Identity, supra note 28.
149. Matsuda, supra note 145, at 8–9 (“A professor once remarked that the mediocre law
students are the ones who are still trying to make it all make sense. That is, the students who are
trying to understand the law as necessary, logical and co-extensive with reality. The students who
excel in law schools – and the best lawyers – are the ones who are able to detach law and to see it
as a system that makes sense only from a particular viewpoint.”).
150. Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson has become the common citation to
support this claim. See 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Our Constitution is
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all
citizens are equal before the law.”). In citing Harlan’s dissent as the ideological foundation of
Colorblindness, scholars too often fail to recognize that Harlan’s reasoning and conclusions were
based in part on his openly racist views about the Chinese. See id. (“There is a race so different
from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to become citizens of the United
States. . . . I allude to the Chinese race.”); see also Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice
Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L. REV. 151 (1996) (critiquing traditional narratives of
Harlan’s Plessy dissent).
151. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV.
1 (1991) (articulating the notion of formal race).
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such as “I don’t see color” and “We are all human beings.” Regardless of the
underlying intent, these statements can create harm by denying the reality of
historical and contemporary modes of racial oppression and discrimination.152
And by denying the existence of racial oppression as common to modern life,
colorblindness excuses all but the most egregious and overt behavior as free
from prejudice.
Conversations about affirmative action, common to first-year
Constitutional Law classes, further illustrate the reciprocally reinforcing nature
of Colorblindness and racial unevenness. This occurs both at the abstract level,
when students refer to affirmative action as a “preference,” and at the more
concrete level, when students wonder out loud whether their classmates were
admitted because of affirmative action.153 Both statements are damaging
because they send a broader message about the qualifications of an individual
and their racial group.154 The presumption that certain bodies do not belong,
which underlies such claims, communicates that Students of Color lack merit
and objective qualifications.155
Even if comments are subtle and not always the product of racial bias,
constantly confronting messages that you (or your race) do not belong can
create serious psychological and emotional harm. Solórzano reports that in
addition to “self-doubt and frustration,” Black students “feel academically and
socially alienated in spaces where such oppression occurs.”156 This harm has
been characterized as “racial battle fatigue”157 and “Mundane Extreme
Environmental Stress” (“MEES”). Solórzano elaborates on MEES:

	
  
	
  
152. Sue et al., supra note 9, at 274; see also JANET HELMS, A RACE IS A NICE THING TO
HAVE: A GUIDE TO BEING A WHITE PERSON OR UNDERSTANDING THE WHITE PERSONS IN YOUR
LIFE (1992).
153. Id. (“During a conversation about hiring or admissions, ‘I believe the most qualified
person should get the job regardless of race,’ or when an employee or student of color is asked
‘How did you get your job.’ The underlying message is twofold: (a) People of color are not
qualified, and (b) as a person of color, you must have obtained the position through affirmative
action.”).
154. See Pinel, supra note 102, at 484; see also Deidre M. Bowen, Brilliant Disguise: An
Empirical Analysis of a Social Experiment Banning Affirmative Action, 85 IND. L.J. 1197 (2010);
Solórzano, supra note 9, at 67 (“[S]everal students indicated that key among the most negative
racial assumptions Whites on their campuses held about them had to do with how African
American students entered the university. . . .”).
155. Perhaps surprising to those who believe affirmative action stigmatizes Students of
Color, such perceptions by Whites are most pronounced in states that have banned race-based
affirmative action programs. See Bowen, supra note 154.
156. Solórzano, supra note 9, at 69.
157. Yosso, supra note 77, at 661 (“Symptoms associated with racial battle fatigue
include: suppressed immunity and increased sickness, tension headaches, trembling and
jumpiness, chronic pain in healed injuries, elevated blood pressure, constant anxiety, ulcers,
increased swearing or complaining, insomnia or sleep broken by haunting conflict-specific
dreams, rapid mood swings, difficulty thinking or speaking coherently, and emotional and social
withdrawal. In anticipation of a racial conflict, reported symptoms include a pounding heartbeat,
rapid breathing, an upset stomach, and frequent diarrhea or urination.”).
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mundane, because this stress is part of our day-to-day experience and is
so common that we almost take it for granted; extreme, because it has an
extreme impact on our psyche and world view, how we see ourselves,
behave, and interact; environmental, because it is environmentally
located, induced and fostered; stress, because the ultimate impact is
indeed stressful, detracting and energy-consuming.158
Applied to the law school setting, such harms can exact an emotional and
psychological cumulative toll on Students of Color. This is a burden their
White counterparts never need to confront and often fail to see. We again see
our two rivers, with disparately challenging currents that students must
navigate on a daily basis.
3. After the Final Exam

	
  

Racial unevenness can arise after the final exam due to the way that
institutions discuss and understand the existence of racial achievement gaps. As
in other domains, law schools can too readily frame disparities as a
consequence of “deficient” students.159 Under this typical framing, the
achievement gap is the result of students’ inherent inferiority160 or inadequate
preparation.161 By placing the fault for relative underperformance on students,
this framing reinforces the underlying tropes about Black and Latina/o
students’ intellectual abilities. Diagnosing the problem as deficient students
also presumes that it is the students, as opposed to the institutions, that need
“fixing.” This framing proceeds from the following formula: If two similarly
situated students162 of different races enter law school with the same talent,
they will have the same chance of success.
For institutions where racial unevenness is present, this formula is illfounded. With evidence that race, independent of talent, preparation, work ethic
or desire,163 shapes opportunities for success in law school, we must critically

	
  
158.
Solórzano, supra note 9, at 17; see also Sue et al., supra note 9 (arguing that
“microaggressions are detrimental to persons of color because they impair performance in a
multitude of settings by sapping the psychic and spiritual energy of recipients by creating
inequities”).
159. See Kimberly West-Faulcon, The River Runs Dry: When Title VI Trumps State AntiAffirmative Action Laws, 157 PENN. L. REV. 1075, 1109–13 (2009).
160. See, e.g., HERRNSTEIN, supra note 78; ARTHUR JENSEN, EDUCABILITY AND GROUP
DIFFERENCE (1973).
161. See STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND
WHITE: ONE NATION, INDIVISIBLE 402–03 (1997).
162.
Similarly situated would mean, for instance, that the two students align along
traditional demographic dimensions (such as gender, age, socioeconomic status, etc.) as well as
academic preparation and desire. The point is to imagine two students who are identical except for
their race.
163. See, e.g., Clydesdale, supra note 11, at 737, 752 n.34 (observing disparate racial
outcomes even when holding constant “LSAT scores, undergraduate GPAs, hours of planned
study, hours of planned employment, various additional distractions, self-confidence, and even
English language difficulties”); Ronald G. Fryer Jr. & Steven D. Levitt, Understanding the Black-
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reexamine the role of our legal institutions in facilitating racial achievement
gaps. As a first step, we must amend the dominant narrative of “deficient”
students and instead focus on rectifying “deficient” institutions.
III.

MEASURING RACIAL UNEVENNESS AT UCLA LAW – THE DAC
SURVEY ON DIVERSITY AND CLASSROOM CLIMATE

	
  

	
  

Even for those readers who accept that racial unevenness exists in the
abstract, many may remain skeptical that racial unevenness exists at an
institution such as UCLA Law. Part of this skepticism may stem from the
unease many readers feel with the words “racist” and “racism,” 164 which likely
come to mind when reading a report on racial unevenness and racially hostile
environments.165 To avoid equivocation, our use of the terms racial unevenness
or racially hostile to describe UCLA Law does not signify that we observed a
conscious intent to create an unwelcoming environment for Students of Color.
Although particular instances likely arise, the majority of the racial unevenness
we observed does not appear to have been the result of intentional
discrimination. Rather, our findings illustrate that the racially hostile
environment that disproportionately burdens Students of Color exists
notwithstanding UCLA Law’s best intentions.
Perhaps due in part to students’ inability to provide sufficient “evidence of
racism,” or choice not to make such allegations, UCLA Law has been slow to
recognize student claims that a problem of racial unevenness exists in the Law
School. For the UCLA Law students who have felt this unevenness, it has been
their burden to prove that racial unevenness does exist. The DAC Survey is the
most recent iteration of this effort. In the remainder of this Article, we detail the
methodology and results of the DAC Survey.

	
  
White Test Score Gap in the First Two Years of School, 86 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 447 (2004)
(“Even after controlling for a wide range of covariates including family structure, socioeconomic
status, measures of school quality, and neighborhood characteristics, a substantial racial gap in test
scores persists.”); Claude M. Steele, Race and the Schooling of Black Americans, 269 ATLANTIC
MONTHLY 68 (1992) (arguing that standard explanations are incomplete, as low SAT scorers are
not more likely to flunk out than high SAT scorers; achievement gaps exist even when Blacks do
not suffer financial disadvantage; and controlling for any level of previous school preparation,
Blacks achieve less in subsequent schooling than Whites).
164. As recent events remind us, few accusations are more damaging in our society than
that of being a racist. See Feingold & Lorang, supra note 67 (discussing the national debate
regarding whether or not George Zimmerman, the individual who shot Trayvon Martin, was
racist). Recently, a federal judge denied the possibility that he was racist while simultaneously
admitting the racist attitudes underlying a private email he sent to friends. See JOHN S. ADAMS,
GREAT FALLS TRIBUNE, Federal judge forwards racially charged email (March 1, 2012),
available at, http://www.greatfallstribune.com/article/20120229/NEWS01/120229014/Chief-U-SDistrict-Judge-sends-racially-charged-email-about-president; See also, Kang, Are Ideal Litigators
White?, supra note 27 (asserting that “few terms generate greater anxiety, concern, resentment,
and passion in U.S. society” than “racist” or “racism”).
165. For others, the terms “racist” and “racism” may be welcomed as the most
appropriate and accurate way to describe institutions that embody the results we report below.
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We first provide a brief historical review of UCLA Law’s racial
demographics. This summary is meant to highlight that Students of Color,
especially Black and Latina/o students, were not always underrepresented at
UCLA Law.166 In 1994, Black and Latina/o students comprised over 100
students in the first-year class.167 The adoption of Proposition 209 and the
subsequent voluntary eradication of race-based admissions at UCLA Law
triggered a dramatic shift in Law School’s racial composition. By 1999, the
entering class of 289 students included 3 Black and 18 Latina/o students
only.168 Over the subsequent twelve years, the numbers slightly improved.
Despite efforts to recruit more Students of Color, out of 319 students, the 2011
entering class included 11 Black students and 25 Latina/o students.169

	
  

A. Method

	
  
1. The Instrument.

	
  

The DAC Survey is a student-opinion survey that contained thirty discrete
items.170 Items fell into one of five categories:
1) Perception Items. The majority of survey items measured student
perceptions of racial diversity and campus racial climate at UCLA Law. A
minority of perception items dealt with gender and sexual orientation. Items in
this group required students to make a descriptive claim that went beyond his
or her individual experience. This differed from description items, which only
inquired into a student’s personal experience.
2) Description Items. As noted above, description items asked students
about their own experience only. Inquiries about personal experience could be
categorized as a form of perception. However, because there is an arguable
difference between a student’s perception about general climate and about his
or her personal experience, we present these items as distinct.
3) Normative Items. Two items required students to make normative
claims. Unlike perception and description items that required students to state
how UCLA Law is, these items required students to state how they believe
UCLA Law should be.
4) Demographic Items. The survey concluded with three demographic
items concerning gender, sexual orientation, and race/ethnicity. For access to

	
  
166. Any claim of underrepresentation requires a comparator to measure representation.
For UCLA Law, the racial demographics of Los Angeles or California are both arguably
reasonable comparators. However, even using national statistics, Black and Latina/o students are
proportionally underrepresented at UCLA Law.
167. Cheryl Harris, Critical Race Studies: An Introduction, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1215, 1237
(2002).
168. Id. at 1236.
169. Statistics provided by the UCLA Law Office of Admissions.
170. For a complete version of the survey, see Appendix A.
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more nuanced data, students may want to consider including demographic
items about socioeconomic status and class year in subsequent administrations
of the DAC Survey.
5) Qualitative Item. The final survey item invited students to include any
additional comments. This item was left open-ended so that students could
write freely without any restriction.

	
  

	
  

2. Participants and Procedure
Eligible participants included currently enrolled UCLA Law students.
Non-JD students and students who transferred into UCLA Law after their first
year of law school were excluded. This decision was made based on the belief
that the first year of law school is most determinative in shaping a student’s
perception of classroom climate.
The DAC Survey was administered to 300 randomly selected students
from the eligible participant pool. To create this random sample, survey
administrators assigned a unique number (1-1,003) to every first, second, and
third-year UCLA Law student. This randomly assigned number corresponded
to each student’s photograph in the UCLA Law photo book. After assigning
numbers, administrators utilized an Excel random number generator to create
an indefinite list of numbers. The list was followed sequentially and students
were selected from the eligible participant pool if their number appeared in the
list. Administrators followed this process until 300 different students had been
selected.
The DAC Survey was created and administered as a Google Form. Google
Forms are electronically created surveys that may be administered over the
Internet. The survey’s administration consisted of a series of three emails that
solicited survey participation from the universe of 300 selected participants.
178 students, or 59% of the 300 selected participants, completed the survey.

	
  
	
  

B. Results
The following section provides a summary of relevant findings. The
majority of survey items presented students with a statement, and then
instructed students to indicate their agreement or disagreement. Common
response choices included: strongly agree; somewhat agree; neither; somewhat
disagree; strongly disagree; no response. Unless otherwise indicated, this
analysis chunks somewhat agree with strongly agree responses and somewhat
disagree with strongly disagree responses. As such, the reported findings do not
distinguish between respondents who marked strongly agree and somewhat
agree. Both responses are treated as agree.
In order to compare responses across demographic categories,
administrators cross-tabbed responses by race and gender. Race cross-tabs were
performed on two levels of specificity. Administrators identified a student’s
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race by looking to the respondent’s self-identified race on the racial
demographic survey item. Five respondents did not select any race and were
excluded from race cross tabs. Using the racial identifiers, administrators first
divided students into two categories: White students and Students of Color.
Since the racial demographic item allowed students to select more than one
race, a number of respondents identified as multiple races. For students who
marked multiple races, one of which was White, administrators had to choose
whether to include students in the White or Students of Color category. For
purposes of this Article, all students who selected White have been placed in
the White category. Some will question this decision as running counter to the
historical rule of hypodescent, in which whiteness is an exclusive category
marked by absolute purity. Recognizing this critique, administrators
recalculated many of the responses using an alternative grouping, wherein all
students who marked two races were grouped in the Students of Color
category. Changing the grouping did not alter results to a statistically
significant degree.
1. Normative Survey Items
Normative survey items produced near unanimous responses. Students
overwhelmingly supported student body racial diversity. Eighty-nine percent of
students (N = 178)171 agreed with the statement, “UCLA Law should have a
racially diversity student body.” Only 4% of students affirmatively disagreed
with this statement. An even greater majority of students reported that the
administration has an ethical responsibility to respond to incidents that make
students feel disrespected or unwelcome because of their race. Specifically,
92% of students agreed with the statement, “The UCLA Law administration
has an ethical responsibility to respond to these types of incidents when they
are made aware of them.” In this survey item, “these types of incidents” refers
to a series of preceding survey items that asked students to state whether the
behavior of another student, professor or administrator had caused them to feel
“unwelcome or disrespected because of my race.”
2. Perception Survey Items – Campus Racial Climate

	
  

Survey items concerning campus racial climate and racial and gender
unevenness revealed significant divergence along racial and gender lines.
Women and Students of Color were far more likely than men and White
students to perceive UCLA Law as a racially and gender-hostile environment.
Seventy-four percent of White students (N = 106) described UCLA Law’s
classroom environment as always or mostly welcoming to students regardless
of race. Only 24% of White students described the classroom environment as

	
  
171. N refers to the number of students in a particular category who responded to the
particular survey item. Subsequent percentages thus refer to the population defined by N.

	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  
2013]

MEASURING THE RACIAL UNEVENNESS OF LAW SCHOOL

105

	
  

	
  

	
  

sometimes or never welcoming to students regardless of race. In contrast, 49%
of Students of Color (N = 67) described the classroom environment as always
or mostly welcoming regardless of race. An equal 49% of Students of Color
responded that the environment is sometimes or never welcoming to students
regardless of race.
Women and Students of Color were also more likely than their male and
White colleagues to perceive racial unevenness at UCLA Law. Seventy-six
percent of Students of Color (N = 67) agreed that “Non-White students face
challenges at UCLA Law that similarly situated White students do not face”
(see table 1). Only 16% of Students of Color disagreed with this statement. In
contrast, 42% of White students (N = 106) agreed with the statement, and 32%
disagreed. Moreover, responses cross-tabbed by gender revealed a similar
distribution. Among women (N = 78), 63% agreed with the statement, while
18% disagreed. Among men (N = 98), 47% agreed with the statement and 35%
disagreed.

	
  

	
  

Students’ perceptions regarding the engagement of race in first-year
courses revealed a similar racial and gender divergence. Among Students of
Color (N = 67) and women (N = 78), only 21% of respondents agreed that
professors who teach first year students actively recognize and promote open
discussions about race in first-year courses. Sixty six percent of Students of
Color and 62% of women disagreed. In contrast, 42% of White students (N =

	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  
106

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 15:1

	
  

	
  

	
  

106) and 45% of men (N = 98) agreed with the statement. Forty percent of
White students and men disagreed.
Women and Students of Color were more likely than their male and White
counterparts to perceive gender unevenness at UCLA Law. Sixty-three percent
of women (N= 78) agreed that “Female students face challenges at UCLA Law
that similarly situated male students do not face.” Only 22% of women
disagreed with this statement. In contrast, 36% of men (N = 98) agreed with the
statement. Forty five percent of men disagreed. Moreover, responses
correlating with race closely tracked correlations with gender. Among Students
of Color (N = 67), 64% agreed with the statement and only 22% disagreed.
Among White students (N = 106), 39% agreed with the statement and 42%
disagreed.
Women and Students of Color were more likely than their male and White
counterparts to perceive sexual-orientation unevenness at UCLA Law. Fortysix percent of women (N= 78) agreed that “LGBT students face challenges at
UCLA Law that similarly situated straight students do not face.” Only 17% of
women disagreed with this statement. In contrast, 28% of men (N = 98) agreed
with the statement. Forty-four percent disagreed. Again, correlations with race
closely tracked correlations with gender. Among Students of Color (N = 67),
40% agreed with the statement, while only 22% disagreed. Among White
students (N = 106), 34% agreed with the statement, while 37% disagreed.
3. Perception Survey Items - Student and Faculty Diversity
A student’s race impacts the way in which that student perceives racial
diversity in the law school. Among Students of Color (N = 67), only 28%
agreed with the statement, “UCLA Law has a racially diverse student body.”
Forty-one percent of Students of Color disagreed with the same statement. In a
near opposite split, 43% of White students (N = 106) agreed that “UCLA Law
has a racially diverse student body,” while 27% of White students disagreed
with this statement.
Cross-tabbing by race also revealed students’ divergent perceptions about
faculty racial diversity. Only 22% of Students of Color (N = 67) agreed with
the statement, “UCLA Law has a racially diverse faculty.” Fifty-eight percent
of Students of Color disagreed with this statement. In contrast, White students
(N = 106) were evenly split, with 35% selecting, “UCLA Law has a racially
diverse faculty,” and 35% selecting, “UCLA Law does not have a racially
diverse faculty.”
Interestingly, even though responses revealed divergent student
perceptions about the Law School’s racial composition, Students of Color and
White students revealed similar perceptions about the administration’s
commitment to racial diversity in the law school. A slight majority of Students
of Color (55%, N = 67) and White students (58%, N = 106) agreed that a
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racially diverse student body is a priority of the administration. One notable
divergence is that 36% of Students of Color disagreed with this statement, in
comparison to only 18% of White students.
Students’ perceptions regarding the administration’s commitment to
faculty racial diversity tracked this convergence. Both Students of Color and
White students expressed a lack of faith in the administration’s commitment to
a racially diverse faculty. Only 31% of Students of Color (N = 67) and just over
40% of White students (N = 106) agreed that “a racially diverse faculty is a
high priority of the UCLA Law administration.” Again, Students of Color were
far more likely than White students to affirmatively disagree with this
statement. In comparison to 24% of White students, 49% of Students of Color
disagreed with the statement that “faculty racial diversity is a high priority of
the UCLA Law administration.”
4.

Description Survey Items

To determine whether students felt their race was relevant at UCLA Law,
the DAC Survey asked students to agree or disagree with the following
statement: “When I am at law school, my racial identity is unimportant. I am
just another student.” Responses revealed that a student’s race significantly
impacts the likelihood that the student is consciously aware of her race and
views her racial identity as relevant at UCLA Law (see Table 2). Students of
Color and White students responded with diametrically opposed views. Only
24% of Students of Color (N = 67) agreed with the statement, while 64% of
Students of Color disagreed. In a near flip, 59% of White students (N = 106)
agreed with the statement, while only 26% disagreed.
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Among Students of Color, responses to this survey item revealed
divergences among Asian American, Latina/o and Black students.172 As the
aggregate responses suggest, Asian American, Latina/o and Black students
disagreed with the statement in Table 2 at a rate far greater than White students.
However, the results from this sample reveal noteworthy divergence (at least
among the individual respondents) among the three racial groups. At 62%,
Asian American respondents (N = 21) were least likely to disagree with the
statement that their racial identity was unimportant while at law school.
Seventy-seven percent of Latina/o respondents (N = 13) disagreed with the
statement. Ninety-percent of Black respondents (N = 10) disagreed.
The DAC Survey also included a series of questions that inquired into
whether another student’s, faculty member’s, or administrator’s behavior made
respondents feel unwelcome or disrespected because of their race. Responses
indicated that, depending on the perpetrator of the incident (student, faculty,
member or administrator), Students of Color were between 3 to 8 times more
likely than White students to experience an incident that made them feel
unwelcome or disrespected because of their race.
Twenty-five percent of all respondents (N = 178) reported experiencing an
incident in which another student’s behavior made them feel unwelcome or
disrespected because of their race. Forty-three percent of Students of Color (N
= 67) reported such an incident, in comparison to only 13% of White students
(N = 106) (ratio of 3.31:1). Disaggregating by race revealed that 38% of Asian
American students (N = 21) experienced such an incident. While more common
than White students’ experiences, Asian American students were less likely to
experience such an incident than Latina/o (62%, N = 13) and Black (60%, N =
10) students.
Additionally, seventeen percent of all respondents (N = 178) reported
feeling unwelcome or disrespected as a result of a faculty member’s behavior.
Cross-tabbing by race revealed that 33% of Students of Color reported
experiencing such an incident, and only 8% of White students reported such an
incident (ratio of 4.13:1) (see Table 3). Disaggregating Students of Color into
individual racial groups revealed that 30% of Asian American students (N =
27) experienced such an incident. Though more common than White students’
experiences, Asian American students were less likely to experience such an
incident than Latina/o (31%, N = 13) and Black (64%, N = 11) students.

	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
172. Due to the small sample size, there may be a legitimate concern about generalizing
these findings across all Asian American students, Latino/a students, and Black students at the law
school. Although we recognize this concern, the data is meaningful regardless of generalizability
and thus worth including in this report. Additionally, these disaggregations are included in order
to mark points of divergence that suggest the need for further research.
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With respect to administrators, only 10% of students reported
experiencing such an incident. Notwithstanding this relatively lower rate, the
ratio between Students of Color and White students increased. While 22% of
Students of Color reported such an incident, only 3% of White students
experienced feeling unwelcome or disrespected as a result of an administrator’s
behavior (ratio 7.33:1). Disaggregating by race revealed that 19% of Asian
American students (N = 27) experienced such an incident. Though more
common than White students’ experiences, Asian American students were less
likely to experience such an incident than Latina/o (23%, N = 13) and Black
(36%, N = 11) students.
Beyond gross and relative differences in students’ experiences with
racially hostile incidents, survey responses revealed that these incidents had a
more severe impact on Students of Color. Among students who experienced
one of the aforementioned incidents, Students of Color (N = 32) thought about
the event longer than White students (N = 15). Sixty-three percent of Students
of Color reported thinking about the incident(s) for multiple days and 31%
reported thinking about the incident(s) for a month or more. In contrast, 53% of
White students thought about the incident for one day or less. And, 33% of
White students reported thinking about the incident for multiple days, while
only 8% reported thinking about the event for a month or more.
To further analyze the impact of such incidents, the DAC Survey utilized
a 10-point scale (1/”Not at all” to 10/”Severely”) to measure severity along five
axes: (1) interference with ability to study for class; (2) detraction from ability
and desire to learn; (3) reduction in class participation; (4) production of
emotional distress, embarrassment, or shame; and, (5) creation of student doubt
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in UCLA Law’s commitment to equal treatment for all students. Constant
across every measure, incidents had a greater impact on Students of Color.
(1) Degree to which the incident interfered with the student’s ability to study
for class.
Incidents were far less likely to interfere with a White student’s ability to
study for class than a Student of Color’s ability to study for class. Of the 16
White respondents, 50% reported that the incident had no effect at all, and 94%
rated the effect between 1-3 on the severity scale. The mean for White
respondents was 1.9. In contrast, responses from Students of Color (N = 34)
produced a near uniform distribution across the severity scale, with an overall
mean of 5.6. Twenty-six percent of Students of Color described an incident as a
1-3 on the severity scale, 47% rated incidents between 4-7, and 26% scored an
incident between 8-10.

	
  

	
  
	
  

How greatly did this incident interfere with your ability to study for class?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Total

SoC

2 4

3

2

6

4

4

4

2

3

34

5.6

White

8

2

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

16

1.9
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Mean

	
  
	
  
	
  

(2) Degree to which the incident(s) detracted from the student’s ability and
desire to learn.

	
  

White students who experienced such an incident were far less likely than
Students of Color to report they suffered a diminished ability and desire to
learn. Among White respondents (N = 16), 75% reported that the incident
affected their desire to learn “Not at all,” and 94% of White students reported
that the event was at most a 3 in severity. The mean score for White
respondents was 1.7. In contrast, responses of Students of Color (N = 34)
revealed a relatively uniform distribution across the severity scale and a mean
of 5.1. Thirty-five percent of Students of Color indicated incidents were a 1-3
on the scale, 35% scored incidents between 4-7, and 29% rated incidents
between 8-10.
How greatly did this incident(s) detract from your ability and desire to

	
  

learn?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Total

Mean

SoC

4

5

3

4

3

5

0

4

4

2

34

4.9

White

12

2

1

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

16

1.7
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(3) Degree to which the incident(s) caused the student to participate less in
class.
Although incidents caused all students to participate less in class, the
effect was far more severe on Students of Color. Of the 16 White respondents,
63% reported a severity score of 1-3. Unlike in previous severity inquiries,
multiple White students reported scores greater than 5 on the severity scale,
with an overall mean of 3.7 (median = 2). This relative increase in severity
appeared in Students of Color’s responses as well. Sixty-seven percent of
Students of Color (N = 34) reported a score greater than 5 on the severity scale,
with an overall mean of 6.8. Perhaps most notable, 32% of Students of Color
reported a 10 on the severity scale.

	
  

	
  
	
  

How greatly did this incident(s) cause you to participate less in class?
1

2

3

4

5

6

SoC

3

0

5

3

0

2

3

White

7

2

1

0

1

1

2

	
  
	
  

	
  

7

8
3
0

9

10

Total

Mean

3

11

33

6.8

0

2

16

3.7

	
  

(4) Degree to which the incident(s) caused the student to feel emotional
distress, embarrassment or shame?
Nearly paralleling the previous item on class participation, responses
revealed that incidents disproportionately impacted the emotional and
psychological well-being of Students of Color. Seventy-five percent of White
respondents (N = 16) reported a severity score of 1-3, and 12% described
incidents as a 10. The mean for White respondents was 3.3 (median = 2). In
contrast, 60% of Students of Color (N = 34) reported a score between 7-10,
with an overall mean of 6.3 (median = 7).
	
  

	
  

	
  

How greatly did this incident(s) cause you to feel emotional distress,
embarrassment or shame?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

SoC

2

3

3

1 2

3

8

White

6

5

1

0

0

0

	
  
	
  

1

9

10

Total

Mean

3 5

4

34

6.3

1

2

16

3.3

0
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(5) Degree to which the incident caused the student to doubt UCLA Law’s
commitment to equal treatment for all students.

	
  
	
  

A student’s race correlated with the degree to which the incident impacted
her perception of the administration’s commitment to equal treatment. Sixty
percent of White students (N = 15) reported that the incident had little to no
impact on their perception of the administration. The overall mean for White
respondents was 3.9 (median = 3). In contrast, only 9% of Students of Color (N
= 33) reported that the incident had little or no impact. Fifty-nine percent of
Students of Color reported a score between 8-10, with an overall mean of 7.3
(median = 8).
How greatly did this incident(s) cause you to doubt UCLA Law’s
commitment to equal treatment for all students?

	
  

1

	
  
	
  
	
  

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Total

Mean

SoC

1

2

1

2

3

2 2

5

7

8

33

7.3

White

5

2

2

1

1

0

1

0

2

15

3.9

1

	
  

5. Qualitative Responses.173
In addition to quantitative survey items, the DAC Survey concluded with
a survey item that allowed students to provide open-ended responses. Fifty
respondents provided a qualitative response. The qualitative responses reflect
that same perceptive divergence that appeared throughout the quantitative
portion of the survey. Illustrative of this perceptive divergence, the majority of
responses either explicitly emphasized or expressly denied the existence of
racial unevenness at UCLA Law.

	
  

	
  

(1) Discussion
Findings from the DAC Survey are consistent with twenty years
of research on campus racial climate.174 Perhaps most notable is the degree to
which perceptions about existing diversity, racial unevenness, and classroom
climate sharply diverged along racial lines. Paralleling past studies in the
undergraduate context, Students of Color at UCLA Law were far more likely
than their White colleagues to perceive UCLA Law as a racially hostile
environment. Students of Color experienced far greater levels of stigma
consciousness175 than their White colleagues. Unlike the majority of Students

	
  
173. Qualitative responses on file with Author.
174. See supra Part I.B.ii (discussing campus racial climate, racial microaggressions and
stereotype threat).
175. As expressed through students’ perception that their race was relevant in the law
school setting.
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of Color who feel marked by their racial identity, the survey revealed that
White UCLA Law students overwhelmingly proceed through law school
without ever consciously thinking about their own whiteness.176
As anticipated, levels of stigma consciousness diverged among non-White
racial groups. Although generalizing across the student body may be difficult
due to the small sample size, clear divergence existed among actual
respondents. Asian-American students demonstrated a larger stigma
consciousness than White students; however, they reported a lower level of
stigma consciousness than Latina/o and Black students. Further research is
recommended in order to obtain a more robust sense of the differing levels of
stigma consciousness across racial groups.
Students of Color were more likely than their White colleagues to
perceive the law school as lacking student body racial diversity. There are at
least two possible explanations for this result. Students of Color might enter
law school with a different baseline regarding what constitutes racial diversity.
In other words, Students of Color and White students may not diverge in their
perception of actual numbers of bodies, but rather diverge in their definition of
racial diversity. Alternatively, race may dictate the way in which students
perceive the relative number of White and nonwhite bodies in the law school.
One unexpected observation was the degree to which the perception of
women tracked that of Students of Color. In nearly every perception item,
responses from women and Students of Color tracked closely together. This
result prompted the belief that women of Color may have been overrepresented
in the respondent pool, thus skewing results. Subsequent analysis of the
respondent pool revealed that this was not the case. This finding suggests that
the responses of White women and White men consistently diverged. A
potential explanation for this divergence is that White women, though they do
not experience racial unevenness, are more likely to have dealt with gender
unevenness in their own lives. This personal experience may make White
women more likely to appreciate racial unevenness, even if they do not
personally experience it.
Beyond perception, the DAC Survey revealed that the campus racial
climate at UCLA Law exacts a disproportionately severe toll on Students of
Color. These findings provide support for the claim that Students of Color at
UCLA Law do not travel down the same river or run on the same track as their
White counterparts. Rather, their route is packed with a variety of racedependent obstacles. Disaggregating non-White racial groups revealed that
routes differ even among Students of Color. Although the sample size was
small, existing responses suggest that Black and Latino students are forced to

	
  
176. Such moments are most likely to occur when race is explicitly discussed; when
whiteness is put on notice.
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traverse the most difficult route at UCLA Law. We suggest further research to
determine the more generalizable validity of this initial finding.
Overall, the findings conclusively show that racial unevenness exists at
UCLA Law. Not only are Students of Color more likely than White students to
perceive a negative racial climate, they are also far more likely to be victims of
a racially hostile incident. The effects of such incidents are far more severe for
Students of Color. Although these findings may paint a negative image of
campus racial climate, it should not be forgotten that students expressed near
universal support for racial diversity and administrative responses to incidents
that make students feel unwelcome or disrespected because of race.
CONCLUSION
The DAC Survey provides a new dimension to previous research on racial
unevenness in higher education. With a focus on the campus racial climate at
UCLA Law, the DAC Survey reveals that hostile classroom climate is not
limited to the undergraduate level. Racial unevenness and its concomitant
burdens are a reality for Students of Color at UCLA Law. We should
understand, however, that UCLA Law is likely far from unique in this regard.
Similar to the undergraduate level, there is reason to believe that racial
unevenness is endemic across law schools.
The DAC Survey’s unambiguous results should be sufficient to warrant an
institutional response. In order to prove an intervention to prove successful, the
prescription must track the diagnosis. Thus, having diagnosed the problem as a
racially hostile environment and an unequal learning environment, the response
must focus on broad, institutional change. Four recommendations are
provided.177
(1) Engage in robust institutional learning.178 As with any other study, the
DAC Survey can only tell us so much. Even as a limited device, the DAC
Survey provided a wealth of information about student experience at UCLA
Law. We have learned that Students of Color experience law school in ways
fundamentally different than their White colleagues. This information is now
available to guide institutional decision-making in the realm of classroom
climate and learning environment. However, the DAC Survey only scratched
the surface. It is thus recommended that tools capable of producing

	
  
177. These recommendations are framed with respect to UCLA Law because the DAC
Survey was administered at UCLA Law. However, the recommendations are in no way unique to
one law school. Although the characteristics of each law school will dictate the precise contours of
any particular intervention, we believe that these four recommendations should translate to most
law schools in the country.
178. See generally Georgia L. Bauman, Promoting Organizational Learning in Higher
Education to Achieve Equity in Educational Outcomes, in NEW DIRECTIONS FOR HIGHER
EDUCATION 22–35 (Adrianna Kezar, 2005) (arguing that enhanced institutional learning is a key
component to the positive development of any institution of higher education).
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organizational learning, such as the DAC Survey and similar instruments,
become permanent fixtures at UCLA Law.
(2) Hire more faculty members interested in supporting student well-being
and improving racial classroom climate. Currently, only a small selection of
staff and faculty at UCLA Law engage in a form of informal mentoring that
helps students navigate the racial unevenness of law school. This mentoring,
which serves an essential institutional function by combating the emotional and
psychological harms flowing from racial unevenness, goes largely
unrecognized and uncompensated by the institution.
To avoid concerns about formalizing new responsibilities, institutions
should reconceptualize notions of merit in the faculty hiring process to
encompass this “mentor” characteristic. By focusing on a candidate’s ability to
“mentor” students, institutions need not worry about the hiring criterion taking
on a race-conscious dimension.179 Although it is possible that a larger
percentage of prospective Faculty of Color would exhibit interest or ability to
serve such a function, race need not be a prerequisite. Thus, public institutions
such as UCLA Law should not hesitate for the fear of engaging in a potentially
prohibited form of race-consciousness.
(3) Admit more Students of Color. As the literature revealed, numerical
underrepresentation plays a role in the manifestation and maintenance of
racially hostile environments. Increasing the number of Students of Color will
improve the learning environment. Some may disregard this recommendation
as a naïve desire to circumvent prohibitions against race-conscious admissions.
There are many arguments why admissions offices should reduce reliance of
the LSAT; however, increasing the number of Student of Color admits does not
necessitate rejecting the current practice. Growing evidence that the LSAT
undermeasures the talent of negatively stereotyped groups provides a
compelling argument that our current admissions system is far from raceneutral.180 Thus, instead of eliminating any reliance on the LSAT, Admissions
offices or the Law School Admission Council (LSAC) should begin correcting
for this mismeasurement, which effectively exacts a race-conscious harm on
deserving and talented Black and Latina/o students.

	
  
179. It is arguable that faculty hiring criteria should become race-conscious in a variety of
ways. See, e.g., Kang, Fair Measures, supra note 1 (explaining that faculty of color may serve the
role of debiasing agents); cf. Kennedy, supra note 24. Recognizing a “mentor” orientation as a
component of merit need not be race-conscious. However, it should be noted that in places where
informal mentoring occurs, the majority of individuals providing this support are often People of
Color.
180. See Feingold, supra note 1 (arguing that law schools should rescale LSAT scores so
as to avoid under measuring the talent of Black and Latina/o students); Walton et al., supra note 1
(reviewing a wealth of data supporting the notion that the LSAT under measures the talent of
negatively stereotyped groups such as Black and Latina/o law school applicants).
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(4) Change the internal conversation. We must stop asking what is wrong
with our students. Constant retreat to this notion misreads the ailment and
reinforces negative stereotypes about Students of Color in our institutions.
Instead of citing students as the source of the problem, we must refocus our
attention on the failings of our educational institutions. Our inability to create
learning environments that allow all students to compete on the same track is a
powerful impediment to realizing healthy racial campus climates.
We believe that concerted efforts to realize any of these recommendations
will produce tangible benefits within any institution. As always, the ability to
identify the correct prescription and actually implement it is always easier said
than done. Still, the challenge should not prevent us from taking steps to realize
the goal of producing educational institutions that treat all of our students
equally.

